The Irish Peace Process Cultural & Training Program: A U.S. Contribution to the Irish Peace Process, 1998-2008

Executive Summary:

The Irish Peace Process Cultural and Training Program (IPPCTP) was a groundbreaking initiative introduced by Representative James T. Walsh (R-NY) and signed into law in October 1998. The IPPCTP is also known as the Walsh Visa Program (WVP). The goal of the Program was to foster cross-cultural understanding and provide training opportunities for young unemployed workers from economically disadvantaged areas of Northern Ireland and the six designated border counties of the Republic of Ireland (ROI). The concept was based on the premise that unemployed young people from all sides of the sectarian divide could benefit from the experience of peaceful coexistence through living and working in a multicultural society. With this experience, the participants could return home better able to contribute to their economy and the overall Peace Process. The legislation authorizing the Program was passed shortly after the signing of the Belfast/Good Friday agreement and served as a tangible U.S. contribution to the Irish Peace Process.

Between 2000 and 2008, 1,309 young people from Northern Ireland (NI) and the six ROI border counties (Louth, Monaghan, Cavan, Sligo, Leitrim and Donegal) participated in the Program. Participants were recruited and enrolled in the Program by the government training and employment authorities in their home countries, Foras Áiseanna Soathair (FAS) in ROI and The Department for Employment and Learning (DEL) in NI.

There were two categories of participants. Category 1 participants were fairly evenly divided, half from the North and half from the South, and traveled to assigned hub cities in training groups. Category 2 participants were nominated by their NI/ROI employers to experience temporary “upskilling” opportunities with U.S. employers. Program participants ranged in ages from 18 to 35. Among them were university graduates as well as those with limited skills and work histories. DEL data showed an approximate 27% / 73% split between Catholics and Protestants.

Design and implementation of this unique endeavor involved three governments: the U.S., Ireland, and the U.K., as well as organizations on both sides of the Atlantic, corporate America, and a U.S. university. Through the planning and design phases, the turbulent and self-described chaotic first year, the transition to ever-increasing stability of the later stages, the Program culminated in what most people familiar with the Program would recognize as a practical and credible enterprise. For these reasons, this legacy document may serve similar programs as a road map and the Program itself may serve as a model.

Over the course of three distinct phases, the Program responded to and mostly overcame challenges. Phase 1 included Groups 1–5c arriving between March and September of 2000; Phase 2 included Groups 6–16 arriving between 2001 and 2003; and Phase 3 Groups 17–20 arrived between 2005 and 2006.

One of the primary challenges over the course of the Program was defining the Program’s target population. Who was the Walsh Visa Program intended to serve? Was it disadvantaged, unemployed young people lacking in skills or training or young people from disadvantaged areas impacted by structural unemployment? This dilemma was resolved somewhat by amended legislation that more clearly defined the population as those without university degrees and those who were considerably longer-term unemployed, essentially those furthest from the labor market. But throughout the majority of the Program, ambiguities about the target population persisted.

Stakeholders on the Island also faced challenges with recruitment during a period of declining unemployment and a buoyant labor market. Causing the greatest complications during the first year was lack of screening of the candidates. If an individual met the Program-specified eligibility criteria (Between 18–35, three months unemployed, three months residency in NI or ROI border counties), no mechanism existed to assess suitability. Return rates were highest during the first year. The level of support participants required was also grossly underestimated. Lack of screening, pressure to get the Program off the ground, and working toward an unrealistic number of visas—4,000 per year as stated in the legislation—had dismal consequences. This untested Program needed the benefit of a slower more measured approach from the start.

In response to these first-year challenges, the stakeholders embarked upon a complete overhaul and restructuring of the Program. Smaller group sizes with increased spacing between arrivals, improved screening and selection, increased participant support, a more rigorous pre-departure preparation and a comprehensive soft-landing orientation helped to prepare participants and ease their transition into the American workplace and independent living.

The addition of organizations experienced with this population and knowledgeable about their culture and the conflict was a welcome change. The importance of attention to cultural matters leads to the suggestion that, in programs like this, using specialists with local knowledge and expertise (both in conflict generally and in that conflict particularly) is recommended.

Conflict Resolution training and a Repatriation Program to assist participants as they transition back home were included in the follow-on phases. Much later in the Program, the Program Administrator (PA) initiated post-Program alumni tracking as a way to determine some indication of the Program’s impact on participants once they returned home. One indicator of success was determined by participants’ status six months after they returned home. Based on data collected by the PA, more than 75% of participants who returned home voluntarily since 2005 were employed or in school and 95% of all participants asked believed the WVP contributed to their careers. Other soft outcomes more difficult to measure, such as cross-border/cross-community relationships, broadened perspectives, changed attitudes, increased work experience and improved skills, were anecdotally evidenced over the course of the Program. Emphasizing that Program success was not easily measurable, the PA often said in public forums “that it may be 20 years before we know the measure of success of the Program and it will only come when participants reflect back on their time in the WVP as a defining moment in their lives.”

Nevertheless, the scope, uniqueness, and ambition of the Program coupled with the inexperience of all of the stakeholders in mounting and managing anything quite like it, have made its legacy and accomplishments noteworthy and called strongly for “the telling of the story.” Other, more specific lessons from the Program may be drawn:

If a Program component is regarded as key, such as conflict resolution, consider making it mandatory for participants.

• Consider the timing of such programs in terms of their full benefit or impact. Even when the WVP began, the economy in the South was growing and the North’s was starting to come to life. One FAS official maintained the Program came “too late” for full benefit to the overall Peace Process. Positive change was already occurring.

• Think through basic elements—numbers, eligibility, screening, and training regimes—carefully and proactively, rather than in constant reaction to challenge and crisis.

• Think about assessment matters—objectives, targets, goals and metrics—in the planning and design phase, not after the program has substantially begun.

The final area considered is the Program’s wider applicability in other regions such as the Balkans, Middle East, or trouble spots in Africa. Some noted barriers such as language as an impediment. Returning home to a weak economy, limited job opportunities, or an active conflict could also impede success in applying a WVP model. There is of course a final requirement: political will and the willingness to commit resources.

The authors and many stakeholders are hopeful that rather than the Program remaining a unique, one-time experiment in peace building, this successful initiative may serve as the basis and model for other future programs.