What Washington Wants in the Horn of Africa

In February 2008, the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) began to "temporarily relocate" its observation force out of the Transitional Security Zone where it had been deployed since 2000. UNMEE was established to monitor and assist in implementing the Algiers Peace Agreement that put an end to the brutal 1998- 2000 border war between the two states.

In early 2008, however, Eritrea blocked fuel shipments to the peacekeepers. UN Secretary- General Ban Ki-moon condemned Eritrea's lack of cooperation and demanded that Asmara resume full cooperation with UNMEE. Eritrea refused and responded that the UN was dwelling on "peripheral matters".

This latest melee over UNMEE is emblematic of the troubled Algiers peace process that may be beyond resuscitation. The specific crisis, however, is also a distraction from the imperatives to address the deeply rooted sources of conflict. UNMEE's forced evacuation is just the latest incident in the bitter feud between Addis Ababa and Asmara and the inability of the international community to find ways to promote regional peace. The conflict between rival neighbors is embedded within a set of domestic political conflicts in each state, linked through proxy conflicts to instability in Somalia and the Ogaden, and is skewed additionally by the application of Washington's global counter terrorism policies to the region.

Each of these realms has its own history and dynamics but each also feeds and in turn is fed by the others. Escalation or stalemate on one level therefore alters conflict dynamics across the others. The inter meshing of domestic insecurities, interstate antagonisms, and global policies create regional "security complexes" in which the security of each actor is intrinsically linked to the others and cannot realistically be considered apart from one another.

Ruling authorities in both Ethiopia and Eritrea have used the border issue and threats to the homeland to justify restrictions on political activity and severe limitations on basic political and civil rights. This democratic deficit, moreover, has allowed both to maintain hard-line positions and militarized policies despite huge costs to their populations. The border stalemate and underlying problems of authoritarian political processes, in turn, are further linked to regional conflicts.

Both Ethiopia and Eritrea compete against each other by supporting rival parties in neighboring states. Tensions over the border stalemate, for example, were displaced, in a way, by proxy in Somalia in 2005 and 2006. Ethiopia supported the Transitional Federal Government and Eritrea supported the rival Union of Islamic Courts, in part hoping to tie Ethiopian forces down in the East. This proxy war adds a further complicating dynamic that makes peace in Somalia more difficult. Ethiopia is unwilling to withdraw from Somalia until it is reassured that Eritrea will not take advantage of the ensuing vacuum of authority. But creating a new broad-based regime seems impossible so long as Ethiopia remains.

Finally, local conflicts in the Horn of Africa have been internationalized by Washington's "Global War on Terrorism." The Bush administration views Ethiopia as a "key strategic partner" that shares "a commitment to address threats by transnational extremist groups". This association directly links Washington with Addis Ababa even while their interests in the region are quite different. While many have seen the Ethiopian intervention into Somalia as an example of U.S. "subcontracting" the war on terror to a regionally, Addis Ababa likely would have acted with or without Washington's approval. Addis Ababa and Washington share concerns regarding Islamic groups in Somalia but for different reasons. Ethiopia worries about the assistance these groups provide to the regime's enemies in Eritrea and domestic insurgencies, while the United States is concerned with alleged links to al-Qaeda and the bombings of embassies in East Africa. The U.S., however, promoted the impression that it was working hand-in-hand with Ethiopia when in 2007 it used its own AC-130 planes to attack targets within Somalia. The strategic relationship associates the U.S. with the regime and its policies in ways that escalate and prolong regional conflicts. Washington's calls for democratization and human rights in Ethiopia are not convincing when high-level officials simultaneously praise the regime's cooperation in the global war on terrorism. Ethiopia's obstruction of the demarcation of the border contributes to Eritrea's hostility toward Washington and the UN.

Washington feels it needs a close relationship with Ethiopia in order to pursue its regional strategic interests. This relationship, however, comes with costs. As with other pivotal states in difficult regions such as Pakistan and Egypt, these sometimes awkward bedfellows receive U.S. support for security reasons but then pursue their own, sometimes brutal, agendas regardless of pressure from Washington. Ethiopia has used the military to respond to domestic opposition, regional insurgencies, and to instability within Somalia. If the growing pressures on Addis Ababa from internal dissent and regional instability converge, an uncontrolled and potentially very violent transition is possible. While the United States has paid high-level attention to Sudan and to issues of counterterrorism in the Horn of Africa, policies toward the border stalemate and authoritarianism in Ethiopia have been reactive, episodic, and largely unsuccessful. Washington needs a new diplomatic strategy in the region that recognizes these growing risks and the links among the border stalemate, fragile and authoritarian regimes, and escalating proxy clashes in Somalia.