Tunisia’s Elections Seal Transition, Raise Fears of Old Regime

Tunisians are making history again. The birthplace of the Arab Spring seems to be setting itself up to be the home of Arab democracy, pluralism and peaceful transition—and a model for the entire Arab world. Last month, for the first time since its independence from France in 1956, Tunisia successfully held competitive parliamentary and presidential elections—praised by international observers as transparent. While the secular Nedaa Tunis party won a plurality in parliament and its leader, 87 year-old Beji Caid Essebsi, was elected president with 55.68 percent of the votes, the real winner of these elections is Tunisia.

On paper, the country has completed its transition since the popular overthrow of President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali four years ago, with a new constitution, transitional justice law and political environment that has allowed new parties to form and compete fairly in elections—a far cry from Ben Ali’s one-party system. It has also survived political crises that threatened to derail progress, most importantly the 2013 assassinations of two influential members of parliament, Chokri Beleid and Mohamed Brahmi. With the help of a robust civil society, Tunisians managed to forge compromises and avoid the pitfalls of their neighbors. But now their leaders have to think about the sustainability of their accomplishments and, most importantly, delivering results to those who launched the uprising against Ben Ali.

That is because today, many Tunisians and observers are asking whether Essebsi winning the presidency represents a return of the “fuloul” (remnants) of the old regime and a successful counterrevolution. Nedaa Tunis’ victory in October’s parliamentary elections already prompted Said Ferjani—a prominent leader of Ennahda, the long-banned Islamist party that came to power after Ben Ali’s fall—to warn that the regime was returning “through the back door.” Nedaa Tunis’ rise is not necessarily a counterrevolution, but the concerns and fears some Tunisians have about this possibility are valid and cannot be ignored.

It isn’t hard to see why: Not only did Essebsi serve in the autocratic regime of Ben Ali’s predecessor, Habib Bourguiba, but in 1965, he occupied the most sensitive position—minister of interior—when torture against political prisoners was widely practiced. Essebsi is linked to highly disputed allegations of torture against the Yousefiyeen opposition movement that worked against Bourguiba in the 1960s. He later served as Bourguiba’s foreign minister and minister of defense, and was a member of the rubber-stamp parliament during Ben Ali’s early years as president. If Essebsi were to resume his predecessor’s policies of repressing political opponents and Islamists, he would likely find staunch regional support, especially from Gen. Khalifa Haftar in Libya and President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi in Egypt. Though he has frequently stated he would be a president for all Tunisians, Essebsi at times already seems more focused on attacking Islamists than on the more crucial task of rebuilding the devastated Tunisian economy.

But even with his background, Tunisians should not rush to assume that Essebsi necessarily represents a return of the old regime or a counterrevolution. 2014 is not 1965. As minister of interior then, Essebsi was beholden to the autocratic leader who appointed him. Today, Essebsi has come to power through the votes of Tunisians, and his loyalty should be, first and foremost, to the people and the democratic process. It is in Essebsi’s interest to emerge as a leader of all Tunisians, regardless of their political ideology, rather than to pursue a narrow agenda of monopolizing the political scene and excluding others. Most of all, unlike in 1965, when his future as a young minister depended on proving his loyalty to Bourguiba, today Essebsi should be focused on his own legacy. As Essebsi himself put it, “Do you think that a man my age will now dominate and restrict freedoms?”

Even with those assurances, the strongest guarantor against a return of the old regime’s practices is still the Tunisian people themselves. State repression that was accommodated under Bourguiba and Ben Ali is unlikely to be tolerated now that Tunisians have broken the wall of fear. Society itself has changed, with new political parties and a more powerful and assertive civil society. Though in power with 85 seats out of Parliament’s 217, Nedaa Tunis faces stout opposition—and must form a coalition to govern. Ennahda, which won 69 seats, is unlikely to join the ruling coalition, instead functioning as a check on political domination and hegemonic behavior.

There is another reason for optimism about Essebsi and Tunisian democracy: Ennahda’s own behavior. Tunisia has rejected the conventional wisdom that Islamists manipulate democracy to reach their goals and then abandon it. Ennahda came to power in the first post-Ben Ali elections in 2011, forming a coalition government with two center-left parties, Ettakatul and the Congress of the Republic. With the country on the verge of unrest after the 2013 assassinations of Beleid and Brahmi, Ennahda acted pragmatically to avert a crisis, agreeing to turn power over to a technocratic government until new elections. The Islamist party publicly accepted the outcome of October’s parliamentary election, after coming in second and losing 20 seats. Its leader, Rached Ghannouchi, emphasized that Ennahda would be happy to “serve the country either in government or in opposition.”

The presidential election further strengthened Tunisia’s transitional model when former President Moncef Marzouki’s publicly accepted the outcome. By calling Essebsi to wish him success, Marzouki became the first democratically elected Arab president in recent history to peacefully surrender power. And in another sign of the strength of Tunisia’s democracy, Marzouki announced the formation of a new movement to “prevent the return of despotism,” joining the opposition and expressing a commitment to hold the new government accountable through peaceful and democratic means.

Institutions are in place to hold Essebsi to his word, including a respected legal system that remains independent. But Tunisia’s new president still must recognize that Tunisians’ fears of a return of the old regime and possibly even authoritarianism are legitimate. Essebsi is not off to the best start: On Monday, Nedaa Tunis chose a veteran of the Ben Ali regime, former Interior Minister Habib Essid, as prime minister. Essebsi must now take measures to reassure his opponents accordingly, such as respecting civil society but especially addressing Tunisia’s economic woes.

Dr. Ibrahim Sharqieh is a foreign policy fellow at the Brookings Institution’s Doha Center and Conflict Resolution Adjunct Professor at Georgetown University in Qatar. Contact him at [email protected], and follow him @sharqieh.