Hezbollah’s Triumph

Head of the Lebanese Progressive Socialist Party Walid Jumblatt’s visit to Syria may have not been a landmark regional event, but it marked Lebanon’s return to the pre-2005, and introduced a new role of Hezbollah in the region. The meeting between the two former foes, Jumblatt and Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, came as a result of “mediation efforts” by Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah. Nasrallah eagerly told the press that “Jumblatt’s visit to Syria was in the interest of the Lebanese politics and the Lebanese-Syrian relations.”

The historic meeting between the ex-enemies is considered a smart move on Jumblatt’s part. As the leader of the Druze minority in Lebanon and a seasoned politician, Jumblatt is well aware of Lebanon’s rapidly changing political scene and the major shifting power structure in the Middle East. Regionally, the recent Syrian breakthrough in relations with the West, particularly with the U.S., led many to believe that Syria is regaining its heavyweight position in the region. Jumblatt’s thawing relations with President al-Assad is an attempt to ride the wave of this Syrian comeback in the region and perhaps to also secure a better position within the Lebanese political system.

For Hezbollah, this reconciliation between al-Assad and Jumblatt was a vital step that enabled the Shiite group to consolidate the opposition in Lebanon, and to give itself more leverage in regional politics. In contrast, Jumblatt’s visit came as an indication of the near collapse of the pro-Western Lebanese March 14 Gathering, led by Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri. Jumblatt’s statements following his return from Damascus on “the importance of supporting the Hezbollah resistance” underlined a major shift in Lebanon’s political scene trying to find ways to live with a Hezbollah-controlled Lebanon. Syria’s relationship with Jumblatt, and for that matter with the pro-Western Lebanese factions, will be contingent on how good their relations remain with Hezbollah, which is now looked at in regional dimension and not only in the context of Lebanese politics. Nasrallah’s successful overture between the two former foes completed Hezbollah’s plan in bringing the Syrian hegemony back to Lebanon. The only distinction, though, instead of having a Syrian military present in Lebanon, as it was prior to 2005, Damascus is back in Lebanon through Hezbollah.

The breakdown of March 14 Gathering is significant for Hezbollah since it managed to secure strong support from Lebanese politicians who were in the past the backbone of the U.S.-backed camp. This Hezbollah triumph is seen in its “political promotion” from the position of a “small army” in Lebanon to a regional political player with front row seat to key issues.

Post Hezbollah-controlled Lebanon means that Hezbollah is fully ready to export its experiment and experience, with the help of Iran and Syria, to other hot spots in the region, such as Iraq or the Palestinian Territories. Hezbollah has proven to be effective in working closely with local extremist groups. The latest example of this was the capture of a Hezbollah cell in Egypt, whose members are “on trial for alleged conspiracy and terrorism.” Media reports have said that at least “five members of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood were among those standing trail.” In 2007, Hezbollah was charged of operating in Iraq as Iran’s proxy through a network of secret cells.

In a related example of Hezbollah’s capabilities in the region was a statement by its Deputy Secretary General Naim Qassem, in May 2009, as he announced that his group was actively supporting Hamas in Gaza. Qassem admitted that “it is one of the secrets of the resistance that we don’t talk about in details of our support, but suffice to say that we are giving them [Hamas] every type of support.”

Hezbollah regional role can be understood within the bounders of Iran’s influence in the region. It functions as a forward operation base for Iran to deter an Israeli threat. Additionally, it lends major help to Iran’s political Shiite expansion in the region. The danger behind this role is that Hezbollah had managed to play the card of Arab nationalism, since it has won the sympathy of the Arab streets following the 2006 Israeli war on Lebanon.

*Rawhi Afaghani is a writer and a Middle East analyst based in Washington, DC.