Avoiding Conflict in the Horn of Africa: US Policy Toward Ethiopia and Eritrea (Council on Foreign Relations Special Report)
Ph.D., International Relations, Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies
M.A., History, Michigan State University
Introduction and Summary of Recommendations
In 2006, the Horn of Africa witnessed major escalations in several conflicts, a marked deterioration of governance in critical states, and a general unraveling of U.S. foreign policy toward the strategically located region. The U.S.-brokered Algiers Agreement to end the 1998–2000 border war between Ethiopia and Eritrea is at a crossroads. Ethiopia has resisted implementing the decisions made by the Eritrea-Ethiopia Border Commission (EEBC), Eritrea has imposed unilateral restrictions on the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE), and both states have rejected the EEBC’s plans to demarcate the border unilaterally. In Sudan, implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement remains incomplete, and the violence in Darfur continues to rage and spill into Chad. In Somalia, the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) has failed to establish itself outside of Baidoa and its rival, the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC), has seized control of Mogadishu and much of southern Somalia. The rapid rise of the UIC in mid-2006 in particular amplified prospects for regional conflict as Ethiopia and Eritrea sent significant military support to the opposing sides. On December 6, 2006, the UN Security Council unanimously endorsed Resolution 1725, a plan supported by Washington to deploy African troops to prop up the authorities in Baidoa. The Islamic Courts have stated that this intervention will be regarded as an invading force and will escalate, rather than reduce, the conflict.
The breakdown of the Ethiopia-Eritrea peace implementation process contributes to the dangerous escalation of regional conflicts. In late 2005, concerns mounted when Eritrea imposed restrictions on UNMEE and both Ethiopia and Eritrea moved troops toward their border. Eritrea hoped to pressure the international community to compel Ethiopia to implement the demarcation decision of the EEBC created by the Algiers Agreement. The situation along the border has been stable since 2000 but may escalate as a result of the Ethiopia-Eritrea proxy battles in Somalia.
The stalemate on the Ethiopia-Eritrea border feeds and, in turn, is fed by growing authoritarianism in both states. Since the 2000 cease-fire, ruling parties in both states have responded to demands for political openings with harsh restrictions and arrests. Eritrea in particular is ruled by an increasingly repressive, isolated, and unpredictable regime. Ethiopia closed down an unprecedented political opening in 2005 with arrests of major opposition politicians, civil society leaders, and journalists, effectively criminalizing dissent.
The border conflict also exacerbates a rapidly escalating domestic political crisis in Somalia. Ethiopia has supported the TFG and has sent its military into Somalia to defend its regional ally. Consistent with a deeply ingrained pattern of supporting the enemy of one’s enemy, Eritrea has provided arms to a wide range of anti-Ethiopian forces operating from Somalia, hoping to tie Ethiopian forces down in the Ogaden, a region of Ethiopia predominatly inhabited by ethnic Somalis and Muslims. Ethiopia may be provoked into a much larger intervention in Somalia, a move that in turn would tempt Eritrea to press its border claims with Ethiopia through military means. The deteriorating situation in Somalia is already derailing U.S. counterterrorism efforts by the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), scuttling early hopes that regional cooperation would be possible. In this way, the Ethiopian-Eritrean proxy conflict increases the opportunities for terrorist infiltration of the Horn and East Africa and for ignition of a larger regional conflict.
While the United States has paid high-level attention to Sudan and to issues of counterterrorism in the Horn of Africa, policies toward the border stalemate and authoritarianism in Ethiopia and Eritrea have been reactive, episodic, and largely unsuccessful. Washington needs a new diplomatic strategy in the region that recognizes these growing risks and the links among the border stalemate, fragile and authoritarian regimes, and escalating proxy clashes in Somalia.
Washington has few good options to address the emergent threats in Somalia. There are, however, opportunities to push for full implementation of the peace agreement that ended the Ethiopia-Eritrea border conflict, which can help dampen the dynamic that contributes to escalation within Somalia. Ethiopia and Eritrea both need the involvement of the international community and the United States in particular to back away from the confrontation on the border. Washington should remain committed to the multilateral Witnesses to the Algiers Agreement and EEBC framework, pressing Ethiopia to demarcate the border and Eritrea to return to talks and lift restrictions on UNMEE.
Washington must speak clearly and critically to both Ethiopia and Eritrea and lay out an unambiguous set of options and specify what types of relationships and assistance the regimes will lose if they persist in prolonging the border stalemate, suppressing internal dissent, and interfering in Somalia. Washington must also indicate what types of support the two countries can anticipate if they initiate real policies of regional cooperation and internal reform. Leaders on both sides will resist public pressures, and thus U.S. diplomacy will need to be subtle and discreet to be successful. Senior members of the U.S. administration must address these issues in direct, face-to-face meetings in the region. The U.S. government should also be prepared to offer substantial financial backing and use its influence within the international financial institutions to support demobilization, cross-border trade and communications, and normalization of regional relations.
Once the border issue is settled, the United States should pressure Asmara to permit basic political rights and Addis Ababa to release political prisoners, enter into a dialogue with the full range of opposition leaders, and return to the freedoms seen in early 2005. Development and military assistance programs should be tied to progress on these governance issues, and Washington should be prepared to reduce or slow nonhumanitarian programs if political conditions deteriorate further. Simultaneously, well-funded programs on democratization and rule of law should be offered to support positive political openings. Washington should also reach out to the wide spectrum of opposition groups both within Ethiopia and in the diaspora and encourage them to pursue strategies of peaceful electoral competition, rather than armed struggle.
Finally, the United States, international donors, and international organizations should support long-term regional peace-building initiatives. Building new relationships between communities split by the militarized border, groups displaced by the conflict, and families divided by loyalties to rival states will provide a context for new thinking and increased confidence about the formal peace process and for building healthier bilateral relations after the border dispute is settled.