Understanding the Pro-Drone Discourse

            “Foucault argues that since we can only have a knowledge of things if they have a meaning, it is discourse – not the things-in-themselves – which produces knowledge.”

- Stuart Hall, Foucault: Power, Knowledge and Discourse. [1]

Michel Foucault’s ideas as conveyed here by Stuart Hall indicate that discourse produces our knowledge of objects. If we accept this premise as true, it would be wise for students of conflict analysis and resolution to pay close attention to the development of new objects in conflict settings. Unmanned aerial vehicles (also known as UAVs or drones) are a prime example of such objects. Over the past ten years, lethal drones have changed the nature of warfare by allowing the United States’ “war on terror” to become increasingly clandestine and asymmetrical. Since the U.S. government has not provided basic information about its covert drone program – such as where drones are used, how targets are selected, and how many people have been killed – the discourses both championing and opposing drones are often backed by flimsy evidence. Yet these discourses are powerful nonetheless. How we talk about drones affects our understanding of them. Discourses that promote drone warfare are particularly dangerous because they encourage killing in spite of their lack of substance. Given that the subject of drone warfare is new, anti-drone advocates still have an opportunity to shape the public’s perception of drones. To begin, we must examine the pro-drone discourse with a critical lens and draw attention to its dangerous implications.

Former White House Counter-Terrorism Advisor and recently appointed Director of the CIA, John Brennan, gave a speech last year to discuss the administration’s use of lethal drones. In his speech, which constituted the first formal acknowledgement of the drone program by the White House, Brennan stated:

“As we have seen, deploying large armies abroad won’t always be our best offense. Countries typically don’t want foreign soldiers in their cities and towns. In fact, large, intrusive military deployments risk playing into al-Qaida’s strategy of trying to draw us into long, costly wars that drain us financially, inflame anti-American resentment and inspire the next generation of terrorists. In comparison, there is the precision of targeted strikes.” [2]

Knowing that the American public is tired of war after the extended invasions in Iraq and Afghanistan, Brennan tries to persuade the audience that using lethal drones is not war. Brennan also sets up a false binary between targeted drone strikes and putting troops on the ground in an attempt to make drones the only option for combating terrorism.  Pro-drone discourses are often set in false binaries, which prevent creative thinking about other ways to address terrorism.  Brennan equates “large military deployments” with long, expensive wars that play into the enemy’s plan and lead to more terrorists attacks. His phrasing implies that drone strikes would have the opposite effect – that using targeted strikes would not produce anti-American sentiment, nor would their usage play into al-Qaida’s strategy.

Brennan appears to acknowledge the desire of other countries to keep their citizens safe, recognizing that they do not want foreign troops in their cities and towns.  However, in April last year (one month prior to Brennan’s speech), the Pakistani Parliament voted to end all endorsement of the CIA’s drone operations. [3]  Surveys conducted by the Pew Research Center in 20 countries around the world show that the majority of them disapprove of the U.S. using drones to target extremists overseas. This stands in stark contrast to the majority of Americans (56%) who support targeted drone strikes. [4]  The Bureau of Investigative Journalism (BIJ), an independent organization which has been conducting an in-depth investigation into the covert drone war, reports there have been nine drone strikes and between 36-71 casualties in Pakistan this year alone. [5]

Brennan’s speech demonstrates three elements that I believe are grounding points for the pro-drone discourse. They include: keeping U.S. troops and citizens’ safe, conducting precise and efficient warfare, and maintaining fiscal responsibility on the part of the military.

Pro-drone advocates claim that drones ensure U.S. troops’ safety while allowing them to pursue the goal of combat. Stephen A. Cheney, CEO of the American Security Project, states, “any time you can use a drone instead of using a Marine, I think it’s a good thing”. [6]  His statement seems logical enough: if we are at war, we want our troops to be safe; if we send drones into battle instead of American soldiers, then more American lives will be saved. However, there is an unstated distinction here between short-term and long-term safety.  While lethal drones ensure that U.S. troops are not put directly in harm’s way, the destruction caused by drones is unlikely to be ignored. We can most certainly expect that a targeted operation of this nature will instigate a severe backlash against the U.S. at some point in the future.

A study conducted by a former member of President Obama’s counterterrorism group, Michael Boyle, states that the use of drones is “encouraging a new arms race that will empower current and future rivals and lay the foundations for an international system that is increasingly violent”. [7] In Yemen, a series of interviews with witnesses of drone attacks suggest that drones have contributed to a rise in anti-American sentiment and may encourage recruitment to al-Qaida.  A former counter-terrorism official at the U.S. State Department concurs: “Drone policy at its current tempo does put the U.S. at the very top of the bad-guys list”. [8]

According to John Brennan, drone strikes “conform to the principle of proportionality”. [9]  In other words, the gains made by the military exceed the damage done by drones. He emphasizes that targeted strikes are directed towards individuals that pose a significant threat. That includes leaders of al-Qaida and other associated groups, individuals planning on carrying out attacks on “U.S. persons and interests”, and individuals that provide support for these attacks. [10]  Brennan says the purpose of targeting these individuals “is to disrupt his plans and his plots before they come to fruition”. [11]  The language he employs attempts to reassure his audience.  By reciting the principles of war the narrative conveys to us that drone strikes are directed only towards those that are about to cause imminent harm.  Yet, how do we know if this is true?  And what gives us reason to think that this is an effective strategy?  Given that the government has not released information about the process of choosing targets, it is impossible to know. In addition, the long-term strategy or timeline for drone strikes is never mentioned. At what point do we say that all terrorist threats are gone and we can stop using lethal drones?  Historically speaking, eliminating the upper echelons of an organization has not always resulted in the group’s termination. The CIA killed thousands of Vietcong leaders during the Vietnam War and the organization survived it.  The spread of al-Qaeda operatives to Mali, even the attacks on the U.S. Consulate in Benghazi, Libya, could be seen as evidence that the U.S.’ counterterrorism policy is not working. [12]  Discourses suggesting that drones keep us safe are situated in a short-term perspective.  Policies that align with this discourse have not considered what retributive violence might happen as a result of the drone program and are very dangerous indeed.

There is another aspect of the safety discourse that is deceiving. The U.S. Justice Department’s 16-page white paper, which was leaked earlier this year by NBC, attempts to make a case for the legality of the U.S. government’s targeted killings. In this paper it states that even U.S. citizens can by killed by drones without charges, a hearing, a trial, or any evidence, as long as an “informed, high-level official of the U.S. government” determines the person is an imminent threat. [13]  The paper does not say whether the official needs to be completely sure or just have a sneaking suspicion that the target is an imminent threat. In fact, the paper’s definition of imminence is so broad that it negates the word entirely.  According to this document all that is required for the government to conduct a targeted strike on a U.S. citizen is the say-so from a senior official and a window of opportunity.

What is particularly worrisome is the lack of judicial checks and balances within the drone program, and the overwhelming power that is being consolidated in the executive branch of government.  Other aspects of the “war on terror” have procedural safeguards; for example, if the government wishes to set a wiretap, it must request a warrant under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.  And while the Constitution allows unilateral executive action in “exigent circumstances”, these actions must always be followed by ex post judicial review. On the issue of drones, the courts are entirely left out of the process. As journalist David Cole writes, it seems that the government “wants the power to kill Americans unilaterally—and in secret”. [14]

As far as we know, three Americans have been killed to date by American-operated drones.  This includes Anwar al-Awlaki, a high-level recruiter for al-Qaida and propagandist who was raised in America and killed in Yemen, and Awlaki’s 16-year-old American son, Abdulrahman al-Awlaki, who was killed by a drone in Yemen two weeks later. [15]  The U.S. administration has said that Anwar al-Awlaki and individuals like him are dangerous enough to warrant being killed instead of captured and given due process. There have been only unofficial responses given by the U.S. government regarding Abdulrahman’s death, including an anonymous official who told the media that his death was a mistake. The discourse that drones keep us safe does not hold up to the fact that our government has unilaterally killed an innocent American teenager, and refuses to give information about his death.  Since the government is intent on creating its own rules with the drone program– and not communicating these rules to the public – it removes any trust we might have in its judgment. [16]

Slavoj Zizek’s work can also provide insight into the safety discourse. In his book, Violence, he discusses three modes of violence: subjective, objective, and symbolic. [17]  He argues that subjective, or overt, violence is the most visible of the three, and often sheds light on objective, or systemic, violence. If we were to apply this theory to the covert drone program, we can see how the violence enacted by drones takes on different forms for different audiences. The violence inflicted by drones is subjective for those on the receiving end, but symbolic to those who view it from a distance (through the news, for example). For the individuals inflicting the violence (the drone operators), it is less direct because it is “hidden” by the monitors and screens through which the violence is enacted.  A study conducted by the U.S. Air Force found that almost half of all drone operators experienced high levels of stress in the workplace, but this stress was tied to working “long and erratic work hours”. [18]  The drone operators did not show increased amounts of stress from watching hours of up-close video footage of killing and destruction inflicted by drones.  Instead, the operators felt “a sense of accomplishment in protecting troops on the ground”. [19]

We can further expand on this idea by historicizing drones in the context of trends in warfare.  Noel Sharkey explains in his chapter “Killing Made Easy: From Joysticks to Politics” that the evolution of the military has led to greater physical space between combatants, along with technology that “enable[s] killing from ever-increasing distances”. [20]  While increasing the distance between combatants caters to our innate desire to keep ourselves safe, the extreme distance in drone warfare also produces alienation and desensitization; it encourages drone operators to become comfortable with brutality and killing. Sharkey’s research along with the research done on drone operators suggests that what we are seeing is the transition of subjective violence to objective violence; in other words, the violence caused by drones is becoming normalized and if it continues it shall soon be rendered ‘invisible’.

The safety elements in the pro-drone discourse are also tied to Karl Marx’s theories about individuals as subjects and objects.[21]  Marx states that the division between subjects and objects is created and perpetuated in a capitalist economy, in which violence is inflicted on individuals as objects.  This is evident in the CIA’s “signature strikes”, in which drones are used to kill people whose names are not known, but who are in the vicinity of other “militants” and either demonstrate suspicious behavior, or have characteristics that warrant their immediate death. [22] By treating individuals as objects, instead of as subjects of equal worth, drones not only aim to kill individuals, but also to promote the objectification of human beings. As Marx said, “The performance of work is at the same time its objectification”. [23]  Once a group of people is objectified, they no longer require safety or protection.  The subjective and objective aspects of drone warfare intend to make others appear “less than”.  Therefore the discourse of safety has the function of treating some Americans (those not targeted by drones) as subjects, while reducing those within the drone’s purview to mere objects.

Bradley J. Strawser, a former Air Force officer and an assistant professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, conducted a study of the drone program and concluded that “using [drones] to go after terrorists not only was ethically permissible but also might be ethically obligatory, because of their advantages in identifying targets and striking with precision”. [24]  The idea presented here is common in many pro-drone discourses – that drones represent the most ethical form of warfare because they are precise. The discourse acts as if drones can pluck out the ‘bad guy’ from the masses, and eliminate him or her with no consequences. This idea is suspect for several reasons. First, even when drones are on target, the blast that emanates from Hellfire missiles generally has a radius of 15 to 20 meters. [25]  That distance does not include the shrapnel projected after the blast. A report on drones issued by Stanford and New York University further explains why it is difficult for UAVs to be precise:

“One factor that reduces targeting precision is ‘latency,’ the delay between movement on the ground and the arrival of the video image via satellite to the drone pilot. As the New York Times reported in July 2012, ‘Last year senior operatives with Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula told a Yemeni reporter that if they hear an American drone overhead, they move around as much as possible.’ “ [26]

This quote is particularly insightful because it shows the ways in which drone targets still can outsmart such “precise” technology.  In addition, it gives a sense of what it must be like for innocent civilians living in the drone’s purview. Pro-drone discourses rarely expound on the lives of those on the other side.

To return again to John Brennan’s speech from last year, we can see other examples of the precision narrative at play. Brennan explained that “compared against other options, a pilot operating the aircraft remotely, with the benefit of technology and with the safety of distance, might actually have a clearer picture of the target and its surroundings, including the presence of innocent civilians”. [27]  The way in which Brennan orders the elements in this story has the effect of painting an image of a pilot who, with the help of drones, is a protector of the innocent.  Brennan goes on to say “it’s this surgical precision – the ability with laser-like focus to eliminate the cancerous tumor called an al-Qaida terrorist, while limiting damage to the tissue around it”. [28]  Instead of portraying a terrorist for what he or she actually is – a human being that has the ability to make choices – the comparison to a tumor dehumanizes the person and depicts him or her as a thing that kills.  The act of conducting drone warfare, on the other hand, is compared to surgery – a highly respected and exacting profession. The chances for error in surgery are perceived as being slim, which is what the narrative would like us to think about drone warfare. It is these themes of precision and accuracy that construct a narrative which makes drone warfare seem like a flawless procedure instead of an act of violence based on nebulous protocol.

The challenge here for both the pro-drone and anti-drone arguments is that there is no way to know for sure how accurate drones are because the data available is incomplete.  Evidence collected from non-governmental organizations suggest the number of civilian casualties is likely higher than the administration admits, but it is difficult to determine whose number is correct. In Michael Boyle’s study he explains that the White House classifies all military-age men that are killed or injured in a strike as militants unless proved otherwise.  Boyle states, “the result of the ‘guilt by association’ approach has been a gradual loosening of the standards by which the U.S. selects targets for drone strikes.” [29]  The Pakistani government recently stated that 400 Pakistani civilians had been killed as a result of drone attacks. [30]

The final theme in the pro-drone discourse is that drones are more cost effective than deploying troops on the ground.  Soldiers cost the Pentagon $4 million over their lifetime, whereas a drone is about 10% of that cost and can be discarded once it becomes dysfunctional.  As defense budgets shrink, the economic rationale to automate military functions will inevitably grow. [31]  Thus, there is incentive for the U.S. to use drones more frequently and for corporations to manufacture smaller, cheaper, and more deadly drones. The global race to develop these machines has started and already produced lethal drones the size of bugs. [32]

The affordability argument sparks a sinister question, which is: What happens when war becomes cheap?  While many drone advocates claim that the U.S. would never engage in war or conduct targeted killings without serious consideration, it is feasible to think that the cheapening of war will lead to more war overall. As it currently stands, the process of deploying lethal drones is far easier than capturing suspected terrorists. It is not far-fetched to think that the administration has been using drones for more than a just a “last resort” given the large numbers of individuals killed by targeted strikes (currently predicted to be about 4,000 individuals). When the U.S. used to conscript soldiers, convincing the American public to go to war required much justification and careful consideration. [33] Today, the White House sends drones without seeking approval or feeling the need to justify its actions to anyone.

The pro-drone discourse often presents lethal drones as the quick, effective, cost-efficient and safe alternative to long and costly warfare. It is evident that while these discursive themes are compelling at first, they are a façade.  Anti-drone activists must work to change the nature of the public discourse. They must emphasize that drones are not accurate and do not make us safe. They must maintain that having a more affordable form of warfare is alarmingly dangerous. Unless we can effectively make the claim that drones reduce disincentives for killing, we can expect our world to become increasingly insecure in the future.

Works Cited

[1] Hall, Stuart. “Foucault: Power, Knowledge and Discourse.” Discourse Theory and Practice: A Reader. Eds. Margaret Wetherell, Simeon Yates, and Stephanie Taylor. London: Sage Publications, 2001. 72-75.

[2] Conan, N. (2012, May 1). John Brennan Delivers Speech On Drone Ethics: NPR. NPR.org. Retrieved October 25, 2012, from http://www.npr.org/2012/05/01/151778804/john-brennan-delivers-speech-on-drone-ethics

[3] Bergen, P. (2012, September 19). Drone is Obama’s weapon of choice. CNN. Retrieved December 15, 2012, from http://www.cnn.com/2012/09/05/opinion/bergen-obama-drone/index.html

[4] After Fight Over CIA Director Ends, A Look at Public Opinion on Drones. (March 7, 2013). Pew Research Center. Retrieved March 15, 2013, from http://www.pewresearch.org/2013/03/07/after-fight-over-cia-director-ends-a-look-at-public-opinion-on-drones/

[5] “Pakistan drone statistics visualized.” The Bureau of Investigative Journalism. (2012, July 2). Retrieved from http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/2012/07/02/resources-and-graphs/

[6] McDonald, Mark. “Are Drone Strikes Worth the Costs?” The International Herald Tribune. 22 Aug. 2012.  Accessed 12 Dec. 2012.  Retrieved from: http://rendezvous.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/08/22/sizing-up-the-effects-of-u-s-drone-attacks/

[7]Hopkins, N. (2013, January 7). US drone attacks “counter-productive”, former Obama security adviser claims. The Guardian. Retrieved January 15, 2013, fromhttp://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jan/07/obama-adviser-criticises-drone-policy

[8] Dyer, G. (2012, October 21). “Drones: Undeclared and undiscussed.” Financial Times. Accessed on December 11, 2012.  Retrieved from http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/7a4114be-19ce-11e2-a379-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2F2CQ2YH7

[9] Conan, N. (2012, May 1). John Brennan Delivers Speech On Drone Ethics: NPR. NPR.org. Retrieved October 25, 2012, from http://www.npr.org/2012/05/01/151778804/john-brennan-delivers-speech-on-drone-ethics

[10] Ibid.

[11] Ibid.

[12] Nasr, Vali. “Decapitation by drone losing effectiveness: Defeating terror networks requires new approach in Obama’s new term.” 19. Nov. 2012. Accessed on 11 Dec. 2012. Retrieved from:http://www.journalgazette.net/article/20121119/EDIT05/311199986/1021/edit

[13] Reilly, R. J., Hersh, J., & Stein, S. (2013, February 4). DOJ Drones Paper: Obama’s Second-Term Cabinet, Agenda Faces New Scrutiny. Huffington Post. Retrieved March 15, 2013, fromhttp://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/02/04/doj-drones-paper_n_2619582.html

[14] Cole, D. (2013, February 6). How We Made Killing Easy. NYRblog. Retrieved fromhttp://www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2013/feb/06/drones-killing-made-easy/

[15] Jay, Paul. (2012, December 9). Obama Writing “Rules” for Killing People with Drones. Truthout. Retrieved December 13, 2012, from http://truth-out.org/news/item/13233-obama-writing-rules-for-killing-people-with-drones

[16] Shamsi, H., & Warren, V. (n.d.). Obama needs to explain drone strikes. Retrieved January 15, 2013, from http://www.presstv.ir/usdetail/281981.html

[17] Zizek, Slavoj. Violence. New York: 2008. 1-15.

[18] Bumiller, Elisabeth. “Air Force Drone Operators Report High Levels of Stress.” The New York Times.  18 Dec. 2011.  Accessed 12 Dec. 2012.
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/19/world/asia/air-force-drone-operators-show-high-levels-of-stress.html

[19] Ibid.

[20] Sharkey, Noel. “Killing Made Easy: From Joysticks to Politics.” Robot Ethics: The Ethical and Social Implications of Robotics. Eds. Patrick Lin, Keith Abney, and George A. Bekey. MIT Press: 2012.  pp. 111-128.

[21] Fromm, Erich. “Marx’s Philosophy of Man.” 1961. p. 95. Retrieved from:http://www.marxists.org/archive/fromm/works/1961/man/ch05.htm.

[22] Jay, Paul. (2012, December 9). Obama Writing “Rules” for Killing People with Drones. Truthout. Retrieved December 13, 2012, from http://truth-out.org/news/item/13233-obama-writing-rules-for-killing-people-with-drones

[23] Fromm, Erich. “Marx’s Philosophy of Man.” 1961. p. 95. Retrieved from:http://www.marxists.org/archive/fromm/works/1961/man/ch05.htm.

[24] Shane, Scott. (2012, July 14). The Moral Case for Drones. The New York Times. Retrieved fromhttp://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/15/sunday-review/the-moral-case-for-drones.html

[25] “Living Under Drones.” International Human Rights and Conflict Resolution Clinic at Stanford Law School and the Global Justice Clinic at NYU School of Law. (2012). Retrieved fromhttp://livingunderdrones.org

[26] Ibid.

[27] Conan, N. (2012, May 1). John Brennan Delivers Speech On Drone Ethics: NPR. NPR.org. Retrieved October 25, 2012, from http://www.npr.org/2012/05/01/151778804/john-brennan-delivers-speech-on-drone-ethics

[28] Ibid.

[29] Hopkins, N. (2013, January 7). US drone attacks “counter-productive”, former Obama security adviser claims. The Guardian. Retrieved January 15, 2013, fromhttp://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jan/07/obama-adviser-criticises-drone-policy

[30] US Drone Strikes In Pakistan Violate Country’s Sovereignty, UN Says. (2013, March 15). Huffington Post. Retrieved March 15, 2013, from http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/03/15/us-drone-strikes-pakistan_n_2883014.html

[31] Krishnan, Armin. Killer Robots: Legality and Ethicality of Autonomous Weapons. Ashgate Publishing Ltd.: 2009. Pg. 2.

[32] Pocket-sized drones deployed to Afghanistan. (n.d.). NBC News. Retrieved March 14, 2013, fromhttp://www.nbcnews.com/technology/futureoftech/pocket-sized-drones-deployed-afghanistan-1B8261027

[33] Rubenstein, Richard E. Reasons to Kill: Why Americans Choose War. New York: Bloomberg Press, 2010.