Humanitarian Hubris and the Politics of Violence

At first appearances the proclaimed motivation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) intervention to protect civilians in Libya is admirable. However, a closer inspection suggests that the justification for the bombing campaign reflects a broader misappropriation of the humanitarian ethic in the 21st century. Violent conflicts are singularly the most bitter of political contests; for a intervening third party to expect to rise above the fray as a matter of virtue is at best naïve and at worst dangerous. Using fighter jets to destroy the ground forces of an international pariah is a political action. Distributing food aid in an area under the control of a warlord is a political action. Building a water sanitation system for a contested government is a political action. Although not an invested ‘party’ to a conflict in the traditional sense, through their interventions third parties become a part of the political landscape that defines the conflict. Without considering the possible impacts of intervention in a wider context, third party expectations of the perceived impartiality of their actions and the neutrality of their identity are a self-created fantasy. The politics of violent conflict are an inescapable, omnipresent reality third parties ignore at their peril and to the detriment of others.

Evidence from Afghanistan and academic literature suggests that there is an expectation among third party intervenors that will be identified as humanitarians purely by virtue of their motivation to alleviate suffering. The failure of these actors to actively reflect upon their identity, both before entering and while in a conflict zone, risks creating a culture of “humanitarian hubris”. In layman’s terms, humanitarian hubris is an unquestioned belief that “who I am and/or what I do is humanitarian because of my want or desire to help others.” Despite efforts by those such as Mary B. Anderson [1], to provoke critical reflections amongst those involved in humanitarian activities, this has for the most part remained atomised at the level of the transactional benefactor-beneficiary relationship. As Oscar Wilde points out, “it is much more easy to have sympathy with suffering than it is to have sympathy with thought.”[2] There is a pressing need for those third parties in violent conflict to recognise that they are sentient actors operating within complex political environments. Those who intervene in these environments must actively seek sympathy with thought; they must critically evaluate how their actions and relationships with other actors affect local perceptions of third party identities.

In 2009 a two-day conference entitled “Saving Lives or Building Peace? Roles and Responsibilities of Humanitarian and Peacebuilding Actors in Conflict Settings” was co-hosted by the United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office and an International/Non-Governmental Organisation (I/NGO) consortium.[3] As the title suggests, panel discussions orbited questions concerning third parties. An anecdote from a representative of the United Nations Department for Political Affairs (DPA) encapsulated the contradiction at the core of assumed notions of humanitarian neutrality on the part of intervenors in contrast to local perceptions of third parties. According to an Afghan colleague of the speaker, the local population believed that there were “three United Nations (UN)” in Afghanistan; each held varying degrees of acceptance and legitimacy. These three United Nations were identified by the colour and symbols of their vehicles. The good ‘Red UN’, was in fact the International Committee of the Red Cross/Red Crescent (ICRC), and the only actor seen as neutral by the local population. The dubious ‘Blue UN’ included a broad range of humanitarian and development agencies that provided immediate relief and direct assistance to the local population. Although their contribution was valued, their entanglement within a distrusted political system (the newly formed Afghan government) left many deeply skeptical of these actor’s motivations and ambitions. The bad ‘Black UN’ included both the DPA and the diplomatic representatives of the international community, who traveled in black vehicles with security details. Members of the ‘Black UN’ were not only seen as enmeshed within the country’s continuing conflict, but also playing an active role that contributed towards corrupt governance, oppressive hierarchies, parochial politics, and violence. Although this simple narrative provides only a crude description of local perceptions of third parties, it demonstrates that such perceptions are constructed in relation to the political context of the conflict. Third parties that fail to engage with the host community through an active process of sympathy with thought may face unforeseen repercussions.

Sympathy with suffering alone does not guarantee that a third party will be identified as a neutral actor. Over the past eight years individuals from the Red, Blue, and Black UNs have been killed in Afghanistan. Even with their level of relative political independence and acceptance the ICRC almost withdrew from Afghanistan in 2003 after the murder of a Swiss delegate.[4] In August 2010, insurgents killed British, German, American and Afghan employees of International Assistance Mission (IAM), an NGO that provided medical treatment and assistance with economic development.[5] Although IAM had been working in Afghanistan since 1996, well before the current conflict, their deaths were in concert with a decision by the insurgency to target external actors who were perceived as legitimising the government of Hamid Karzai. Most recently, seven United Nations employees were killed in the relatively peaceful town of Mazar-e-Sharif, as part of a reaction to the infamous Quran burning by Pastor Terry Jones. Those killed reflected the spectrum of activities undertaken by the UN; a Swedish human rights officer, a Romanian political affairs officer, a Norwegian military advisor, and four Nepalese guards#. These tragic events provide evidence that local actors will not identify third parties as neutral simply by virtue of their humanitarian intentions.

In response to the hostile contexts in which they work, many humanitarian and development workers have become reliant on fortified bunkers and protection from armed groups; frequently the protagonists to the conflict. Mark Duffield argues in a recent book[7] that this “bunkerisation” of humanitarian assistance reinforces perceptions amongst beneficiaries that those who intervene are complicit with the parties to a conflict. The process of bunkerisation creates a paradoxical relationship of dependency; in order to continue their efforts to alleviate human suffering self-proclaimed humanitarians must work within structures identified by those they seek to assist as being responsible for violence, oppression and brutality. In addition to providing an explanation as to how perceptions of ‘Blue UN’ and ‘Black UN’ identities may have been constructed, bunkerisation also represents a physical manifestation and metaphysical consequence of humanitarian hubris. There is a pressing need for those with humanitarian ambitions to have sympathy with thought. Those who intervene in violent conflicts must critically reflect upon the dynamics that shape the perceptions of their identity, including the relationships they form and the actions they take.

In contrast, the ICRC has actively engaged in a process consistent with the idea of sympathy with thought and has intentionally avoided the practice of bunkerisation. Whilst the death of the Swiss delegate in 2003 brought about a period of critical reflection within the organisation, the ICRC consequently rejected external pressure to work in cooperation with the Afghan national government.[8] At the previously mentioned conference, the ICRC argued that their continued dedication to the principles of confidentiality, neutrality, impartiality and universality has enabled them to gain access to areas under Taliban control; their success demonstrated by their unique ability to visit detainees of the Taliban.[9] Unlike others in Afghanistan, the ICRC has recognised that neutrality is not a passive concept, but an active process developed through thoughtful interactions with the host community. Decisions made by the ICRC – motivated by sympathy with thought – that run counter to the conventional wisdom of bunkerisation have resulted in it being identified as a relatively neutral actor within Afghanistan.

In Libya NATO – under UN Security Council mandate – has engaged in a military intervention to protect those caught up in the fighting between the forces of Muammar Gaddafi and still as yet unidentifiable rebels. This protection has come in the form of a bombing campaign that claims to solely target sites and forces tied to the Gaddafi regime. Despite attacks on Gaddafi’s domiciles NATO rejects the accusation that political regime change is the intervention’s objective.[10] Instead, they claim it is humanitarian by virtue of its motivations to protect civilians.[11] However, the NATO air campaign has included the bombing of targets in urban areas causing the inevitable collateral damage to non-combatants, including the deaths of Gaddafi’s grandchildren. In response, the offices of the United Nation’s were ransacked in retaliation to the NATO air campaign, subsequently forcing those responsible for organizing and providing relief aid to leave the country.[12] Although conscious of the very real possibility that this apparently spontaneous act of violence may in fact have been committed at the bequest of the regime, this episode raises a serious issue. Arguably, as a result of these air strikes the identity of the UN agencies providing humanitarian relief in Libya has merged with that of the UN approved NATO forces engaged an intervention that is justified by the responsibility to protect non-combatants.

Immediate responses have been to condemn this attack upon organisations seeking to alleviate the suffering of those in the midst of a civil war, but few have questioned why the blurring of two identities (humanitarian and military) has occurred. The UN can be best understood as a vehicle, a functional device that acts in accordance with decisions made by the member states at the controls. This vehicle has the capacity to both alleviate human suffering through humanitarian relief and sanction it by approving military action, at times simultaneously within the same country. The United Nations Security Council’s decision to sanction military action on the premise of humanitarian assistance has created a hubris that ignores the humanitarian imperative of sympathy with thought. Perhaps those at the helm of NATO are true idealists, regardless, simply being motivated by a desire to prevent human suffering does not provide a blanket amnesty for the means to this end. When people are killed by bombs dropped from unseen aircraft flying at 30,000 feet, and the only visible marker of those responsible for these deaths can be found on the offices of civilian agencies, can we honestly act with surprise when relief agencies become the target of reprisals? Not only is NATO’s bombing campaign contradicting its objective of civilian protection, but its misappropriation of the humanitarian ethic to justify the intervention has had a disastrous effects upon the impartial identity that civilian actors rely upon for protection when distributing relief aid.

This article should not be read as a misanthropic tirade, nor is it written in ignorance of the challenging and hazardous environments that third party intervenors must operate in. Certainly, the empathic desire to assist those in need is one to be admired and applauded. Such acts often require difficult decisions be made within bitterly contested political contexts. Third parties must decide how to ‘do no harm’ within complex environments that offer a myriad of choices, but rarely a clearly identifiable correct course of action. Yet, with the rise of liberal interventionism and the Responsibility to Protect agenda there is a pressing need for those engaged in the analysis and resolution of conflict to debate how the humanitarian ethic can be applied in the 21st century. A third party may aspire to neutrality of identity and impartiality of action, but they are not guaranteed anything by virtue of motivation alone. Instead, intervenors’ identities are constructed by their behavior and the relationships they form within a conflict setting, all of which will subsequently be judged by local actors. Failure to engage with the politics of violence due to humanitarian hubris risks enforcing ‘Blue’ and ‘Black’ identities due to perceptions of involvement with disreputable actors, and unintended consequences that may discredit conceptions of humanitarian intervention. Empathy alone does not equate to humanitarianism. Sympathy with thought is essential for a third party to help define their sense of self, the scope of their mission, and the possible ways in which their actions might be interpreted by local actors. Humanitarian principles do not alleviate suffering or do good on the basis of their own accord.

At the time of writing, helicopter gunships are being deployed as a part of NATO’s escalating humanitarian mission to protect the people of Libya. I am not persuaded that 30mm chain guns and Hellfire missiles were the tools of a “humanitarian” that Red Cross founder Henri Dunant had in mind when seeking to alleviate the human suffering of Solferino in 1859.

Notes:

[1] Anderson, M., Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace – or War, Lynne Reinner, 1999

[2] Wilde, O., The Soul of Man Under Socialism, Penguin Classics, 2001

[3] http://www.gpplatform.ch/2009-saving-lives-or-building-peace-roles-and-r...

[4] http://www.irinnews.org/PrintReport.aspx?ReportID=19552

[5] http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/08/08/AR201008...

[6] http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-12940014

[7] The term “bunkerisation” was recently used by Mark Duffield when giving a lecture in 2011 http://www.bristol.ac.uk/global-insecurities/news/2011/7.html that built upon the key concepts of Duffied, M., Development, Security and Unending War, Polity Press, 2007

[8] http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/interview/afghanistan-interv...

[9] http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/news-release/afghanistan-new...

[10] “This is not about regime change. This is about bringing an end to violence against a population by engaging troops that are directly bringing harm to the population.” – Lieutenant General Charles Bouchard, Commander of the Operation Unified Protector, 26th April 2011. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_72902.htm

[11] Serwer, D., Strikes On Libya: Humanitarian Intervention, Not Imperial Aggression, The Atlantic, 19th March 2011, http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/03/the-strikes-on-...

[12] http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13253896