Erdoğan the Saint, Erdoğan the Sinner: Quo Vadis Turkey?

Magazine Article
Ali Ersen Erol
Ali Ersen Erol
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Erdoğan the Saint, Erdoğan the Sinner: Quo Vadis Turkey?
Authors: Ali Erol
Published Date: March 15, 2012
Publication: Unrest Magazine
Topics of Interest: Eastern Europe, Middle East, Western Asia
Issue: 6
ISSN: 2156-9819

Erdoğan is, perhaps, one of the most controversial topics in Turkey, Europe, and some parts of the Middle East. For those who are unfamiliar, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is the current Prime Minister of the Turkish Republic and soon he will be celebrating his unrivaled 10th year in power. He has a host of accomplishments and here is a brief list: He won 3 consecutive elections in Turkey, all with record breaking voter support. He also has a lot of international support. He has been quite influential in the region and his quasi-zealous religious background, anti-Israel rhetoric, as well as, pro-Hamas stance provide him with a fan club among much of the Muslim population in the Middle East. He does not hesitate to answer any European leaders arrogant talk, usually in the same tone—providing him with great support among the populous who feel a certain sense of pride in their leaders talking back to the West. He revitalized the Turkish economy and made it one of the fastest growing economies in 2011.

Character, discourse, actions and political rhetoric of such a successful politician is surely interesting enough; still, public attitudes towards him are even more gripping. Of course there is love and there is hate—and that confusing place in between. What is striking however, is the intensity and the extent to which he is loved and he is hated. TIME magazine’s survey for 2011’s “person of the year” cover can provide an important insight. During the survey, Erdoğan was chosen as one of the most loved and the most hated nominees at the same time. Similar attitude is also reflected in the media as well as on the street. Mass media in Turkey, for instance, is polarized around Erdoğan. While some newspapers and T.V. stations defend his every move, some are dedicating themselves to fight his every word. Moreover, talking with people in Turkey reveals a similar dichotomy: while some people are avid supporters to the point of turning their support into a cult-like dedication, others are showing the same level of commitment in their hate and criticism.

There are reasons for both. In addition to the aforementioned accomplishments, he provided new roads and hospitals in certain poverty-stricken areas in Turkey and some people believe he is breaking social taboos regarding minorities. On the other hand, since his rise to power in 2002, the civil war in Turkey escalated back to the peak it had in the mid 90’s. The number of journalists and intellectuals in prison are so numerous that European Federation of Journalists started a campaign named “set Turkish journalists free.” Coincidentally, all imprisoned are avid critics of the government and Erdoğan. There are increasing numbers of women, ethnic, religious and sexual minorities murdered, lynched or assassinated—existence and escalation of social polarization is very visible. These are all coupled with a constant threat of imprisonment, monetary punishment, lawsuit, public defamation and social pressure against those who dare to seriously criticize Erdoğan or his party. While supporters and those who benefit see his good deeds, skeptics keep pointing to ever shrinking circle of freedom; resulting in a constantly widening gap among the Turkish public around Erdoğan.

This does leave us with a question: Who is Erdoğan? Is he the saint, the provider, getting 50% voter support, opening hospitals, universities, providing both domestic and international populations with roads, goods, services and pride that had been lacking for the last 80 years? Or is he the villain, the evil genius orchestrating a social takeover—who has judges imprisoning his critics, police arresting his supporters, Erdoğan-supporting-staff taking over almost every aspect of bureaucracy and driving out non-supporters and minorities getting—often physically—crushed under the iron-fist-tyranny of the majority? And what will the answer mean for the region in the light of Arab Spring?

2012

We can talk about 2012 as a turning point both for Turkey and the Middle East, especially as it pertains to Erdoğan and how he shapes the country and the region. The first issue is the fact that, technically, he is in his last term according to his own party’s laws. Second, there is the issue of journalists, students and protesters who were detained and imprisoned without any accusation or judgement. Third, Turkey is dealing with an escalating civil war, which will be a very important issue within this year. Fourth Erdoğan’s attitude and role in the Middle East has further implications for the region. Finally, 2012 will also be important to see how Erdoğan engages Europe.

The ruling party’s own laws prevent Erdoğan from becoming the party leader and the Prime Minister for a fourth term. Will they be changed in order to keep Erdoğan in power? Or will they adopt the Russian model: making Erdoğan the president for a term, then come back to work in the party? The catch, however, is that the Turkish presidency is supposed to be non-partisan. The President has very little, if any, political power and in Turkish political culture, the presidency is the last step before retirement. Again coincidentally enough, current laws and regulations surrounding presidency are vague due to a recent change in how the President is elected. For Erdoğan and for Turkey, 2012 will be the year when the public will find out the future of their relationship with Erdoğan.

2012 will also be the year when we will find out the fate of the journalists, protestors and students who have been detained in prison without and judgement. Their detainment is coming to its 5th year. Will Turkey witness more of the same? Will Erdoğan’s rule provide the judicial system and the police with further intolerance? Or will he at least try to mend some of the wounds that have become more and more severe within the last decade?

The Turkish Republic, and especially Erdoğan, should have understood that a lack of non-violent communication leads to an increase in violence. Since he has been suppressing political representation of the minorities, the civil war—or as the Turkish State likes to refer to it, “terrorism”—has been severely escalating. In 2012, Turkey will either witness the most bloody year since the last decade, or if Erdoğan decides not to block channels of non-violent communication, Turkey will observe a decline in the death toll due to the civil war.

Manifesting itself at Davos and reaching its peak at the ship-raiding incident, Erdoğan is known for his notorious anti-Israeli and pro-Hamas stance. Coupled with his support towards social uprisings in the Middle East—right after refusing to return the “human rights” award he personally received from Qaddafi—Erdoğan has a certain support and some influence in the Middle East. Turkey’s growing economy, especially compared with its neighbors, and cultural exports also help with Erdoğan’s fame and popularity in the region. In 2012, the individual uprisings are bound to take some shape—we are bound to see at least the beginnings of some governing bodies, structures or political systems replacing the ones that have been overthrown. While they will decide on their relationships with the other Arab states and Israel, it is worthwhile to observe Erdoğan’s advice for the newly forming states, about their relationships with Israel. Will Erdoğan seek to maintain the distance Turkey has with Israel, and perhaps, call for support from newly forming states? Or will he take this opportunity and use his popularity to promote peace and regional harmony, hoping to influence the new Middle East towards cooperation?

Last but not least, there is the question of Europe and the European Union. In his first term, Erdoğan made almost every constitutional and social change Europe asked. As soon as his second term began, however, these reforms were stopped. And almost halfway into his third term, he is ready to cut his ties with Europe and is increasing his use of anti-Western rhetoric. Although not as critical as aforementioned issues, 2012 will also be the year where observers can get a sense if Erdoğan will pursue further integration or distance.

Uncertainty: Quo Vadis Turkey?

The reason for such degree of uncertainty regarding these major issues is not only due to Erdoğan’s unpredictability, but also because of the unpredictability of public opinion towards Erdoğan: for instance, although he has 50% voter support, there is a protest almost every other week. It is too early to tell, with increasing social problems, if his support will crumble away; or if Erdoğan will manage to persuade his constituents towards another victory.

Erdoğan, ultimately, is a politician. Within the constraints of a democratic system, unless he plans challenging it, he has to respond and also shape the public demand. That leaves us with the final conundrum: Quo Vadis Turkey?

Yes, the media attempts to set agendas and prime certain topics over others; yes the politicians do their best to charm, unite and divide through their rhetoric; and yes, public opinion is shaped largely by these sweeping claims, generalizations and ill-intended speeches. Looking at these large and macro systems of social control might leave very little hope for individual agency. The question, however, still lingers: Quo Vadis Turkey?

Critical questions mentioned above, regarding fate of Turkey, minorities and Turkey’s influence in the region, will be answered by the Turkish public. Public shaping policies, and claiming a democratic moment once in a while might look too idealistic for some. And I wouldn’t have agreed more—before the Arab Spring. People of the Middle East, however, raised our hopes and expectations regarding the power of the people. The least we, the public, could do is to work towards ensuring that our word decides our fate. If the Turkish public shifts its opinion towards Erdoğan’s sainthood, he can interpret that as an approval of his deeds. As a result, we can expect an escalating conflict, rising death toll and increasing international tensions from a saint. If the public opinion shifts towards judging him as a sinner, however, he may decide to change his policies. Consequently, we may end up seeing improvement towards free speech, de-escalating civil war with decreasing death toll, improvements for minority rights and increasing international harmony in the region from a sinner. What is it going to be? Erdoğan the Saint or Erdoğan the sinner? Quo Vadis Turkey?

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