Can State Legitimacy Be Tied to Funding?

Pierre Englebert argued in a recent New York Times op-ed (as well as in a previous article with Denis Tull) for the removal of state status or legitimacy from some nations that are failing to adequately perform their functions of state and government, most notably Somalia. Their reasoning is novel, and a bit frightening: most African states were recognized as states during decolonization before they had actually begun to function as independent states, and thus they were given a gift of sovereignty by outside actors, rather than develop sovereignty organically, as a contract between a ruler and a people. The authors presume that this means those outside actors also have a right strip this sovereignty away. The illegitimacy of states and governments has been used as an excuse for foreign powers to invade, and the lack of recognizable state structures existing in parts of the world became the basis for colonialism. Questions of what is legitimate secession, versus and illegal attempt of a region to breakaway, have allowed struggles for independence to continue, often violently, for decades because the international community and neighboring countries cannot agree on whether to intervene and on which side. Thus, what Englebert is advocating for is not entirely unprecedented, though he is approaching it quite differently.

On some points, this argument is quite sound. Legitimacy of a government or nation is, or should be, derived from contracts between a ruler and a people. Though most international relations focuses on the Weberian or Westphalian notions of states – entities that lave legitimate control over violence and/or territory – little attention is paid to where this legitimate force or control comes from. Critical theorists, from the early days of Marx onward, would agree that the legitimacy of the state (if there can be such a thing; many would argue that there is no such thing as a legitimate state) springs from the people being governed, and that states that do not represent or have the support of the people are not legitimate. Engels viewed the state as arising from the society it was governing; alienated from the society, but an inherent product of the society, not something forced on the society from the outside:

"The state is, therefore, by no means a power forced on society from without; just as little is it ‘the reality of the ethical idea’, ‘the image and reality of reason’, as Hegel maintains. Rather, it is a product of society at a certain stage of development; it is the admission that this society has become entangled in an insoluble contradiction with itself, that it has split into irreconcilable antagonisms which it is powerless to dispel. But in order that these antagonisms, these classes with conflicting economic interests, might not consume themselves and society in fruitless struggle, it became necessary to have a power, seemingly standing above society, that would alleviate the conflict and keep it within the bounds of ‘order’; and this power, arisen out of society but placing itself above it, and alienating itself more and more from it, is the state" (Engels, in Marx and Engels, 1973, pp. 177-178).
 

When leaders fail to uphold their end of the bargain and do not provide stable state structures and governments that meet the needs of the people, then they must be replaced. This view is not a creation of Marx and their contemporaries, of course, but one espouses by many political thinkers, including Rousseau those who wrote the United States Constitution.

However, in Englebert’s view, the legitimacy is actually conferred or removed by outside (read: Western) actors, and this stinks of colonialism and paternalism. If the ruler or the people are not strong enough to create or enforce a social contract, then stronger states will do it for them, never mind that the state is weak and fractured in the first place due to colonialism and a lack of self-rule, created by another, stronger state (or conceivably and perversely even the same one). This was one of the arguments for colonialism, and indeed, on a more personal level, for slavery. Members of the “uncivilized” regions could not govern themselves in a way recognized by the west, so the western countries would do it for them. Territory in Africa and other regions was carved up arbitrarily, sometimes deliberately splitting populations to weaken a people’s ability to resist colonial control. Of course, we now know that African tribes did control territory, did engage in trade and other agreements, did form alignments with other tribes, and in short, met most of the criteria of statehood, just not necessarily with the forms of parliamentary or royal governments the west was accustomed to. However, years of colonial rule disrupted these vast trade agreements and family networks, leaving African nations foundering to create new, stable structures when the colonial powers left. Some have succeeded admirably, but those countries that are still foundering are not doing so out of any innate inability to govern themselves, but at least in part because of the disruptions of colonialism and the neo-colonialism brought about by resource exploitation. This is the corollary that Englebert misses – the African states created hastily in a wave of decolonization only needed to be created because they had been colonial holdings of European nations that carved up African territory to suit their needs and whims, not the needs of the people living in those territories.

Engelbert argues that as a result of outside donor governments removing legitimacy in the form of foreign aid, citizens will jump on the illegitimacy bandwagon and overthrow failed leaders. In the case of Somalia, he suggests removing funding from government structures and instead focusing it on the would-be breakaway region of Somaliland, which does not have any official measure of independence but which is nevertheless functioning better that the supposedly legitimate central state. It is an interesting way to approach failed or failing states; deal with the structures that are functioning, regardless of whether they are legitimate or legal under international law and opinion. It is also in line with how the US and some other nations deal with Taiwan – to trade and create relations without officially recognizing the state. Taiwan provides a model of a sort of hybrid state status – independent in many ways and engaged in trade and diplomatic relations with other nations, but still not technically independent from China and considered by China to be a province. Much of the international community has adopted a One China policy that recognizes the main land Chinese government as the sole legitimate government, while still recognizing that Taiwan is functioning as an independent nation. These countries are playing a sort of child’s game of politics – if they put their hands over their eyes and say they can’t see an independent Taiwan, they are still free to engage in trade and other relations with one of the most prosperous entities in the region. This allows countries to enjoy the prosperous relationship, without having to support Taiwan’s bids for full independence and UN membership, which would anger China and upset that prosperous relationship. It also fails to set a precedent for other prosperous would-be breakaway regions. Rather a convenient bit of ambiguity.

More powerful (again, usually Western) nations should not be permitted to recognize some aspects of a state’s legitimacy while denying that the state itself is legitimate or independent. This is true of our relations with Taiwan; the government should stop being hypocritical, recognize that we are involved in trade and other agreements with a sovereign state, and support Taiwan’s bid for UN membership. It is also true of Somalia ñ if the State Department (or the Defense Department or any other department) elects to shift funding and support to Somaliland, to bypass the non-functioning government in Mogadishu, then the US should recognize the independence and sovereignty of Somaliland, regardless of whether it sets a precedent for other reasons seeking independence. Though Englebert likely has the best interests of the people at heart, and his suggestions must spring from frustration at so many years of failure and death in Somalia, creating and enforcing such a precedent in the interest of saving lives in the short term may not be in anyone’s interest in the long term, because it reinforces the notion that some people just can not be trusted to govern themselves. This is of course one of the recurring questions of humanitarian intervention ñ do we have the right or responsibility to intervene even if we are doing lasting harm over time? As one of the most interesting blogs on the subject notes it its title, “good intentions are not enough.”

None of the mechanisms for conferring or removing legitimacy discussed above is satisfactory. They all rely on the actions and needs of strong outside nations and structures to create legitimacy, rather than on the inherent right of a people to govern themselves and their territory. The world is full of minority ethnic groups attempting to assert their right to self-rule. Their claims are often denied, not because they lack a historical right to their land or because they do not have valid grievances against recognized governments, but because their independence would upset the status quo, lead to a loss of funds for the recognized government, or set a precedent for another region or people seeking independence. This is certainly the case of the Kurds, the world’s largest ethnic minority not in control of their own state. The Kurds have historical claim to the land on which they live, have suffered abuses at the hands of the governments of the countries they live in, and in the case of Iraq at least, control a wealth of resources that could allow them to create a prosperous independent nation. However, if Iraqi Kurds achieved independence, they would likely take Turkish, Syrian, and Iranian Kurds with them, something those governments would find unacceptable. Turkey has said repeatedly that it will not allow the Kurds, represented by the often-violent PKK, to secede. For fear of upsetting an important ally, the United States cannot back Kurdish independence, even though the Kurds could potentially form another key ally in the region. Instead, emphasis is focused on the creation of power sharing; semi-autonomous structures that fail to meet the needs and expectations of either the Kurds or the ethnic Iraqis. This author had the opportunity this summer to work with several Iraqi Kurdish teenagers, and all of them (well educated kids from politically active families) felt that an independent Kurdistan was an assured eventuality, not an impossibility or even a hope. The question is how an independent Kurdistan, or Abkazia, or Somaliland or any other country seeking self rule will come about ñ whether through a paternal, neo-colonial relationship contingent on adequate performance or through organic self-determination and rule. For the independence of any nation to be legitimate, it needs to come from the people in the territory being considered. If a people in the territory feel the government does not represent them or is not meeting their needs, then they have a right to either replace the ruling government with something that meets the needs of all the people, or to secede and form a new country.

Works Cited:

Englebert, P. (2010 June 11). To Save Africa, Reject its Nations. New York Times (online).https://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/12/opinion/12englebert.html?_r=1

Englbert, P., Tull, D. (2008). Post Conflict Reconstruction in Africa: Flawed Notions about Failed States.International Security. 32(4), 106-139.

Engels, F. “The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State” in Marx, K. and Engels, F. (1973)Selected Works, Vol.3.