This study attempts to contribute to the advancement of the predicting capabilities of early warning systems of violence eruption. It focuses mainly on predicting the likelihood of people, especially the weaker party, resorting to violence in situations of asymmetric conflict.
Most of the current early warning systems use objective factors (e.g. repressive policies, unemployment, arms acquisition) that are available in the conflict environment as indicators of the likelihood of violence outbreak. This research argues that the availability of objective indicators does not necessarily translate into violence unless the concerned people perceive them as worthy of revolt. Objective indicators are necessary, but not sufficient, to transform the conflict to violence. The conflict becomes ripe for violence when people's perceptions develop in favor of using violence to pursue their national objectives. This ripeness, therefore, could be used as a reliable early warning indicator of the likelihood of violence eruption.
More importantly, this research attempts to identify the types of perceptions that represent ripeness for violence. It argues that people are most likely to resort to violence when they perceive their issues to be under great threat, the adversary's power to be insignificant, their own power to be great, and the alternatives to violence have been exhausted. The development of these kinds of perceptions indicates a strong possibility of concerned parties resorting to violence; therefore, an early warning indicator could be established. To examine these assumptions, this research selects two cases where the weaker parties resorted to violence in spite of the power imbalance prevailing in the conflicts. The first case is Kosovo from 1989 (the arrival of Slobodan Milosevic to power) to 1997 (large scale violence). The second case is Palestine from 1993 (the Oslo Accord) to 2000 (the Intifada).