The Influence of Power and Knowledge Factors on Negotiation Processes, Perceptions and Outcomes: Environmental Regime Negotiations
The purpose of this study has been to test and refine the effects of power-based and knowledge-based variables on negotiation processes, perceptions, and outcomes in environmental regime negotiations. The basic strength of this study is the application of an experimental-simulation approach in the negotiation of the ozone regime for quantitative-statistical analysis. The emphasis has been on the analysis of the interaction between power and knowledge variables.
Tape-recorded simulation negotiations were content-analyzed to construct competitive/cooperative and disagree/agree indices for a negotiation strategy/style analysis. In order to achieve triangulation through a multi-method approach, the real-life climate change negotiations were also coded from the audio/video recordings of the conference of parties (COPS) negotiation sessions. The results were compared with the simulation sessions to increase external validity.
The results of the simulation questionnaire showed that the interaction of knowledge and power factors was clearly statistically significant for outcome and perception indicators in which the power symmetry with knowledge (SK) condition had the highest number of resolved issues and of complete agreements with the most satisfaction with outcome, as well as the most cooperative perception of the negotiation climate.
Overall, knowledge is beneficial when the parties in simulation had equal power. It is possible to argue that a power symmetric structure managed the complexity because equality is stable and simple and that scientific/consensual knowledge reduced uncertainty in the simulated environmental regime negotiation. The power symmetry was better when knowledge was available in the experimental condition. The end result was a positive and cooperative climate, resolved issues, and a satisfactory outcome. When there was no interaction, the parties in the power asymmetry (ASY) condition had both a cooperative climate and a satisfactory process because both high and low power coalitions applied tradeoffs, issue linkages, and concessions on the environmental and developmental issues of the simulation. Power asymmetry rarely produced deadlock since both high and low-power coalitions had the ability to move each other with offers and counteroffers, and thus facilitated effective processes with satisfying outcomes.
The theoretical and practical implication of the simulation findings is that science and politics are so deeply intertwined that the creation of any environmental regime requires the existence of both scientific/consensual knowledge and power symmetry in the negotiation structure. The second implication is that the power asymmetry can still be efficient and productive with a positive climate and a satisfactory process, because all sides were empowered through the negotiation process. The implication of the experimental simulation and the real-world findings is that the parties in a power asymmetry (ASY) condition used a less competitive style than those in a power symmetry (SYM) condition.