Michael Shank interviewed Afghanistan’s Ambassador to the US on March 6, 2008, regarding Afghanistan’s poppy and poverty problems, relations with Pakistan, U.S. presidential candidates’ policies vis-à-vis Afghanistan, Paddy Ashdown, and talks with the Taliban.
JIPO: What do you make of the United States’ new tack in dealing with poppy in Afghanistan – that of planting pomegranate instead of spraying crops? What’s your assessment regarding the most effective way of addressing the opium problem? Do you see promise in providing farmers with alternative crops?
Ambassador Jaw ad: First we have to be very clear that there is no one solution for a very complicated problem such a poppy. There is no silver bullet to kill this beast. Over-emphasis has been made, actually a lot over the past five years, on eradication, all types of eradication, manual or aerial spraying or others, which is important but only aspect of fighting narcotics. It’s one fifth of the strategy.
That strategy must have five pillars. First is eradication. The second is interdiction, going after the traffickers. The guys who are making most of the money are not the farmers it’s the trafficker and the processor. It’s important to enhance the interdiction capabilities of both the international community and the Afghan government.
The third is alternative livelihood. Again, not alternative crops: logically, economically, socially it doesn’t make sense to say “now don’t grow poppy, instead grow pomegranate or grape.” It’s not going to work. If you’re looking for alternative livelihood that means that you’re going to have to introduce a number of crops depending on the region. It could be rose for rosewater, it could be sunflower, or it could be cotton or a number of other products. But equally important if you’re going to succeed on that you have to have facilities to process this. A pomegranate, in order to create value, must be converted into pomegranate juice and exported outside. Or grape [converted] into a more valuable product. So the third aspect is an alternative livelihood and that includes an alternative crop, but the alternative crop is just one part of the alternative livelihood. The real task is development, infrastructure, building the roads, making sure that the legitimate crop gets to the market.
The fourth component is building institutions, police, judicial system, the courts, and others. The fifth component is reducing demand through regional cooperation. As long as there is demand, somebody will grow them. And as long as countries around Afghanistan do not cooperate on eliminating trafficking and processing, that problem will continue. So there has to be five pillars. Eradication is one pillar but this is only one-fifth of the fight.
JIPO: Do you feel that the international community is predominantly focused only on this one aspect? Ambassador Jawad: Eradication, yes. That’s why there hasn’t been that much progress. JIPO: In light of the recent United Nations report, which focused on the demand for opium throughout the world, do you think there is insufficient attention paid to the demand side of Afghanistan’s narcotics problem?
Ambassador Jawad: Again, as much as reducing the demand is a long term project, as much as the regional cooperation is a long term project, as much as development and building infrastructure is a long term project, fighting narcotics is a long term project. It takes from five to ten years. But it takes a comprehensive approach by all parties. We are not going to succeed on that if we’re going to try one aspect, just interdiction or just eradication. We have to have all of them.
We have to have an incentive for the farmer to do something else. But you have to have a strong enforcement capability, which comes from interdiction, institution building and eradication. Eradication just by itself pushes the farmers into the hands of the terrorists.
JIPO: Focusing in on Helmand Province, with its social services and infrastructure remaining underdeveloped — only two hospitals serving a population of over 800,000, for example — what are the linkages between poverty, lack of infrastructure, and the fact that Helmand Province produces much of Afghanistan’s opium and maintains the strongest insurgency?
Ambassador Jawad: Not only in Helmand but in every province where we have most of the security challenges, that’s exactly where we have most of the poppy. One exception is Badakhshan. In Badakhshan, in northern Afghanistan, we don’t have a lot of security problems. There the problem is one of remoteness and lack of infrastructure. The government and police cannot be there. It’s a huge province with very limited roads. Sometimes it takes three days to travel from one district to another district. So they’re taking advantage of that lack of infrastructure, lack of civility.
But in the south, Helmand has been the hotbed of Taliban operations. That’s where we have the most poppy. And the reasons are manifold. First is, of course, where there is a lack of security, psychologically, the farmers will grow poppy because it only takes three months to grow. You’re not going to invest in building your orchards or vineyards if there’s no road, no stability, and no sense of tomorrow. So you grow something quick, you need the money then.
Of course the Taliban are pushing them.
They’re giving them money. They come in the winter and they lend money to the farmers with interest that goes up to 50-60 percent up to 100 percent. The only way to pay it back is by growing poppy. They willnot be able to pay by growing potato or wheat.
Definitely there is a strong linkage between these. In the areas where we have a stronger presence of the Taliban and operation of the terrorists, then the military and the police is not going to do anything about poppy.
JIPO: You’ve talked a lot about the need to build institutions in Afghanistan. Is there a role for the U.S. here despite the fact that U.S. aid to Afghanistan has been primarily military, with reconstruction aid totaling only 10 percent of U.S. assistance?
Ambassador Jawad: Yes, but more funds should go specifically towards capacity building of the government, trade and private sector capabilities. That capacity building consists of two parts. One is training, and the transfer of skills; training the judges, the prosecutors, the traders, the shop keepers, to be able to integrate into this global market, by having the pomegranate from Helmand to reach Dubai. That requires a better degree of understanding of how to package it, how to get it to an airline, how to get it to Dubai. So those are all important steps that need to be taken in training and transfer of skills.
The other part is to provide better funding for the government to pay better to keep the civil servant, the teacher, and others to continue to work for the government. Pay forty dollars to the teacher, while the economy grows at a much faster rate, and the teacher will leave the job andbecome a taxi driver or something else because he can make a lot more money. If you don’t pay adequately you don’t get qualified people. Particularly when the economy is picking up, if their salaries stay the same, instead of building capacity the government is bleeding capacity.
JIPO: Do you think this message is making its way to the U.S.? Ambassador Jawad: To a certain degree, yes, specifically there is a lot more emphasis on capacity-building but a lot of the capacity building is now based on sending consultants and getting reports.
This is not the way to do it. You really have to create this capacity among the Afghans. The consultant comes in, he is charging something like $10,000 - $40,000 a week, and then they write a report and they take it back on their laptops. You really have to work with the ministries, the institutions that lack this capacity, not create parallel structures, an advisory board, a panel or a commission combined of Afghans and foreigners, that is not effective. You really have to invest that money and those resources in the ministries and in the office of the governor or district chief at the local level too to create that capacity.
The PRTs (Provincial Reconstruction Teams) can play an important role of not only digging wells or building a clinic but also teaching the Governor or his staff how to open an email or write an email. If there are traders there locally, bring them in and teach them the basics of how to come up with a balance sheet.
[Teach them the] basics on the marketing and packaging— simple things that could be very beneficial for them.
Capacity-building is really a transfer of skills, at every level. That transfer of skills doesn’t mean bringing them here to get an MBA, though this is needed also at a different level, but even a two-day course is effective at the district level. Have a course for the police officers on respecting human rights. This is all capacity-building. Equally important, make more funding available to the government to pay better. When they pay better, they recruit more qualified people. When they don’t pay, nobody shows up, or they are unqualified.
JIPO: Do you see any of the three U.S.Presidential candidates—Obama, Clinton, or McCain—shaping a new effective policy vis-à-vis Afghanistan?
Ambassador Jawad: Fortunately everyone — the Congress, the Administration, media, the think-tanks —understands the magnitude of the problem. There’s a better degree of willingness to grasp that yes we are facing a serious challenge here. And what we have done has been effective is certain aspects and in other areas we have to do it in a better way, a different way. We are grateful that the Democrats are indicating that they will do more for Afghanistan. Equally important, the administration is about to increase their support for the country. What is important for us is for U.S. policymakers to see and understand that stability in Afghanistan means stability in the region and also Security in the United States.
JIPO: Do you have any thoughts on how the new coalition government in Pakistan will impact Pak-Afghan relations?
Ambassador Jawad: I think it’s a step forward. We always in the past argued for the strengthening of civic organizations, civil rule in Pakistan. We are happy for the fact that the election was fair and transparent. In the long run, what we expect from the Pakistan government is to fight extremism in a sincere way. And to recognize that extremism is a threat for Pakistan, for Afghanistan and for the world. Any government that is based on that, we offer our support, our friendship.
JIPO: How do you see the Afghan-Pak border issue being dealt with?
Ambassador Jawad: The border is not an issue. The same, weak capacity that exists in patrolling the Pakistani border, in fact a much weaker capacity exists along the Iranian border, the border with Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan. Why is no one coming from there? So the problem is not the border. The problem is what’s happening on the other side of the border.
You have almost no one at the Canadian border; most people are coming from Mexico. It’s not the border or how many people you have at the border with Mexico or Canada; it’s what’s happening on the other side, poverty and many other things that are driving people from Mexico into the United States. That force is not in Canada. It’s not the border. It’s not how many big walls you build on the border. It’s what’s happening on the other side. You can build walls but it’s not going to help. You have to go to the source.
JIPO: Why was Afghanistan not interested in having Paddy Ashdown serve as the UN special envoy?
Ambassador Jawad: Coordination in Afghanistan needs to take place at three levels: First, among the international partners; Second, among the international partners and the government of Afghanistan at the national and local level.
Paddy Ashdown played a role in bringing the international players together. But it’s equally important that the coordinator enhance the coordination between the international community and the Afghan government. That will happen only if the international community considers Afghan important. Therefore, based on his experiences, and based upon what we heard, there was concern about the way he operated in the past. Getting back to your question on pomegranate, you’re not going to resolve the problem of Afghan narcotics by pomegranate. You’re not going to resolve the problem of coordination at the international level with Paddy Ashdown. You’re not going to have coordination if you’re not ready to be coordinated.
These different countries, with different degrees of commitment and different mandates, they will not change overnight and say tell us Lord Ashdown what should we do? Now the gentleman from Norway will take his place. I’m sure that he’ll try his best. But this is not a key that you just turn around and say we have appointed this person. No, there is going to be a lot of hard work for us, for the international community.
JIPO: There has been a lot of debate within Kabul and within the international community as to whether or not talks with the Taliban should take place. Do you think reconciliation with the Taliban will ultimately need to have them at the table?
Ambassador Jawad: Yes. There are different degrees of engagement right now. President Karzai, the government of Afghanistan, our international friends now understand more and more why we are coming from that position and have shown willingness. We will talk with the Taliban. Provided they respect the Afghan constitution. The Afghan constitution is a joint achievement of the Afghan people and the international community that came to assist Afghanistan. Underneath that framework, we have indicated our willingness to talk with the Taliban.