While Georgian Minister for Reintegration Temuri Yakobashvili’s announcement this week of the Georgian initiative to declare Abkhazia a weapon-free zone was met with disdain by Russia and Abkhazia, there is merit to a much broader consideration of Zones of Peace. Beyond simply banning weapons, Zones of Peace are geographic areas where violence is limited and a culture of peace and tolerance is encouraged. Zones of Peace, already successful elsewhere, present promising prospects for the future of the South Caucasus, particularly if structured so as to be attractive to all involved. For example, if the Georgian government were to work towards making all of Georgia – not only Abkhazia-- a weapons-free zone, that idea might find favorable Russian and Abkhaz consideration.
Rather than becoming a battlefield for global power struggles, the Caucasus as a whole could transform into a Zone of Peace, where no military powers would compete and all cultural traditions, religious practices, and languages would be respected. We know transformations are possible; post-World War II European reconciliation giving rise to the E.U. demonstrates radical transformation. Zones of Peace in the South Caucasus are also possible—hopefully without another sixty-year delay.
Zones of Peace have worked to keep villagers in Colombia and the Philippines safe from the violence surrounding their homes, to protect eighty-six communities in a larger Local Zone of Peace in Ecuador, and to safeguard residents along the mountainous Peru-Ecuador border. In an even grander peace initiative, the entire country of Costa Rica relinquished its military forces. Zones of Peace could offer similar benefits in isolated villages, across buffer zones, or regionally throughout the South Caucasus.
There is a history in the Caucasus of markets serving as informal Zones of Peace in the towns of Egret and Sadakhlo, and at the Red Bridge market. While local people from across conflict lines have bought and sold produce, they have also kept communication open between their communities. More of these micro Zones of Peace could facilitate necessary local trade, while simultaneously keeping grassroots communication open between the societies separated by conflict. Legalizing and supporting markets in Zugdidi near the Inguri, near Sadakhlo, the Red Bridge area, and Ergneti would minimize the threat of heroin trade or other illicit activities by allowing appropriate regulation of market activities.
Larger buffer zones already established along the lines of conflict could also become Zones of Peace. Instead of resounding with daily sniper fire, these spaces could become truly demilitarized zones. Unarmed military observers or others invited by the local community could patrol such security zones to prevent illegal activities and protect their demilitarized character.
An even more ambitious regional Zone of Peace would remove military forces from the whole South Caucasus, allowing economic interests to flourish and a culture of peace to develop. With local police curbing crime, the people in the zone would stop allocating precious resources to fight debilitating wars, and development would surge with more open market access. In the absence of the threat of war, travel between the conflict zones would be restored, and a longer-term conversation on settling political differences without the use of force could develop. Only a stable Zone of Peace, and much time, will make real reconciliation possible.
The peace within the European Union was not built overnight. It emerged from the ashes of World War II when a few individuals envisioned the possibility of cooperation. They started with coal and steel, and grew into more multifaceted cooperation.
The South Caucasus, too, could be dramatically different in time. Zones of Peace could start small with markets along the conflict lines, then build towards whole buffer zones, and eventually include broader regional arrangements. Gradually building Zones of Peace will steer the Caucasus away from a future of ongoing geopolitical struggle and violent conflict, and instead toward one of interethnic and interreligious coexistence.
The Georgian initiative for a weapons-free Abkhazia is only one version of a Zone of Peace. In this tense post-war period, other structures including parallel demilitarization on all sides would be more widely attractive to all parties. Both small and large Zones of Peace can only be built cooperatively, when all parties willingly giving up the option of resorting to violence.
The radical transformation from a war-torn region to a beacon of peace will require courageous risks. Are we willing to take risks today so that, in two or three generations, coexistence in the Caucasus will be as obvious as the E.U.’s post-World War II integration is today?
About the Authors:
Susan Allen Nan is Assistant Professor of Conflict Analysis and Resolution at George Mason University. Irakli Kakabadze teaches Peace Studies at Cornell University. Arsen Kharatyan is a founding member of the youth movements Sksela and Hima. Jamila Mammadova is a South Caucasus Program Officer at the Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy. Ekaterina Romanova is a Ph.D. Candidate in Conflict Analysis and Resolution at George Mason University.