The Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution
requests the pleasure of your company at the
17th Annual
Vernon M. and Minnie I. Lynch Lecture

presented by

Richard Falk
Albert G. Milbank Professor Emeritus of International Law, Princeton University
Visiting Distinguished Professor in Global and International Studies, University of California, Santa Barbara

Resolving Conflict in the 21st Century: New Challenges, New Opportunities

Monday, April 5, 2004
7:30 p.m.

George W. Johnson Center
Sid and Reva Dewberry Hall
George Mason University

Reception preceding the lecture at 6:30

Announcement: ICAR has its own Home Page at www.gmu.edu/departments/ICAR

George Mason University

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ICAR news

An Exit Strategy for America in Iraq
Richard E. Rubenstein

ICAR Newsletter – Spring 2004

When it comes to outlining a credible exit strategy for U.S.-led coalition forces in Iraq, American politicians of both major parties seem stricken by paralysis. While President George Bush pledges to keep U.S. troops in the country "until the job is done" (that is, indefinitely), most Democratic Party leaders, declaring that we cannot just "cut and run," call for Bush and others to pour *more* troops into the Iraqi cauldron. Meanwhile, the war continues, moving to the back pages of the news even as it takes an increasingly ruinous toll in American and Iraqi lives, treasure, and moral capital.

Are there alternatives to the current armed struggle? It depends. If the United States is *not* waging a war of conquest aimed at securing control of Iraqi oil resources and dominating the Muslim world, conflict resolution principles can help the United States and Britain to withdraw their forces with honor, in such a way as to leave behind a functioning, independent society. If the United States intends to make Iraq a satellite state and a base for further incursions in the Middle East, however, the war will almost certainly continue until America consolidates her imperial hold on the region or is forced to withdraw.

A real problem: popular insurgency
In an article for *USA Today* dated August 20, 2003 ("Withdraw the Troops"), I noted that "violent attacks against the occupying troops, their allies, and their Iraqi collaborators have taken place at the rate of approximately thirteen assaults per day, and the pace is stepping up. Unfortunately, the measures adopted by U.S. forces to combat the resisters are virtually guaranteed to expand and strengthen the resistance

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Mission Statement

The Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution (ICAR) is an innovative academic resource for people and institutions worldwide. Composed of a community of scholars, graduate students, alumni, practitioners, and organizations in the field of peacemaking and conflict resolution, ICAR is committed to:

- **Advancement of the understanding and resolution of protracted and deeply rooted conflicts among individuals, groups, organizations, and communities throughout America and other nations through research, teaching, practice, and outreach;**
- **Systematic and ongoing analysis of the nature, origins, and types of social conflicts;**
- **Development of the requisite processes and conditions for their productive resolution.**

Director's Column

Dear ICAR Community:

2003 has been a year of change and upheaval, at ICAR, and in the world. The geopolitical map hasbeen re-drawn with the invasion and occupation of Iraq. With the shadow of September 11 hanging over US foreign and domestic policies, fear, rather than relational connection and community provides the platform for politics. And, in my view, it is hard to imagine a world where peace and cooperation could flourish, in a context where the seeds of vengeance and hatred, distrust and discontent are unintentionally nourished.

We know from lived experience, and from research, that unintended consequences are inevitable, for who could predict the course of events that are, by nature, non-linear and multi-dimensional. Complexity, in terms of multiple and overlapping variables, and complexity in terms of non-linear and chaotic dynamics are the conditions for conflict analysis and resolution, and the necessary correspondence we might hope would connect actions to outcomes, so we could better divine next steps with care and collective consideration, are difficult to trace. In fact, perhaps the present complexity which, dooms at some level, our ability to predict outcomes, only highlights and accents the necessity for collective consideration. "Being right" used to be possible, but in a post-enlightment, multi-cultural world, we instead need to wrap ourselves in the cloak of participatory processes to protect ourselves from making bad decisions. Even though process does not preclude bad decisions, for certainly groups can be as crazy or crazier than individuals, it does help inoculate groups against the "blame/counter blame" cycle by fostering collective responsibility. And in fact, the interruption of the cycles of blame/violence could well be the benchmark (as opposed to negotiated settlements) for an ethical conflict resolution process.

This attention to the quality of process, to ethics, to the meanings that people make from within conflict processes, and to their sense of self /other, is central to the research and practice at ICAR. Ever attentive to culture, history and meaning, ICAR faculty and students are working on multiple projects, as reflected in the pages to come, that illuminate questions at the heart of our research agenda: the role of religion in conflict and conflict resolution, the relationship between globalization and conflict, the dynamics of change processes, and the development of reflective practice. ICAR's Research and Scholarship Committee is planning a conference on these themes for the spring, working to delineate the edges of knowledge and the boundaries of our collective ignorance. We have postdocs and research assistants working on these topics, so underneath the diversity of faculty interests, there is a heartbeat of shared work and collaborative projects as these projects described on these pages reveal.

In keeping with ICAR's focus on religion and conflict, we are proud to announce the creation of the James H. Laue Chair in World Religions, Diplomacy and Conflict Resolution. Professor Marc Gopin is the first person to hold that Chair; he comes to us from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and we are delighted to have him join the ICAR faculty. We have also created the Center for World Religions, Diplomacy and Conflict Resolution within ICAR. This Center, as well as the Laue Chair, will focus on developing research, theory, and practice that enhances our understanding of the role of religion in conflict, with specific attention to the positive role religious traditions can play in peacebuilding. Research projects, as well as a mini-conference, are under development. We expect that the Center, under the direction of Professor Gopin, will bring attention to the important symbolic dimensions of conflict, and enable policy makers to design interventions that harness those dimensions for conflict resolution.

Programmatically, ICAR has grown. We are poised Fall '04, to launch an undergraduate program, a BS/BA in Conflict Analysis and Resolution, in collaboration with the College of Arts and Sciences at George Mason University. As this program, it will enhance the focus on conflict analysis and resolution at

Continued on next page

Director's Column – Continued

George Mason; the added depth to ICAR will provide teaching opportunities for graduate students, as well as a "feeder" for ICAR's graduate program. Graduates from the undergraduate program will be able to apply their skills and knowledge in the federal and international agencies that abound in the metropolitan DC area. And the influence of ICAR, in the policy community will grow.

Facilitating our engagement with policymakers, ICAR is moving toward the development of Point of View (POV); POV is the name for the estate, donated by the Lynch family to ICAR that includes 120 acres on the Potomac. It was the dream of the donors, as well as the ICAR community, to develop this site as a research and retreat conference center where parties in conflict can work through their differences, as well as restore themselves and their relationships. ICAR has a blend of state and local funds available for the development of this property; there is a marketing study underway that will provide the foundation for the business plan, as well as the fundraising efforts to come.

To support the development of Point of View, the Rice family endowed the Henry Hart Rice Chair to anchor the research and practice agenda at Point of View. This year, ICAR is pleased to announce that Professor Nadim Rouhana has been named to that Chair; he will join the faculty in Fall '04, and we, here at ICAR, are delighted that he will be part of our community. With his expertise in problem-solving workshops, coupled with his critique of asymmetric negotiations, he will bring important perspectives and skills to our faculty.

We have two other faculty that have joined ICAR this fall ('03); Assistant Professor Mark Goodale joined ICAR this fall; with both a J.D. and a Ph.D. in Anthropology. Professor Goodale brings a focus on the adoption of transnational/global discourses within local cultural communities. Using "human rights" as an exemplar, he studies the way these discourses are harnessed for local action.

Dr. Goodale has a Fulbright to Romania this spring ('04); ICAR faculty and students are delighted with his presence and look forward to his contributions. Additionally, Professor Linda Johnston continued her appointment as a "Visiting Assistant Professor" this fall; Dr. Johnston, herself a graduate of ICAR, teaches the applied courses and students flock to her classes, not only because of the importance of these course, but because of her excellence in teaching.

And ICAR continues to grow; we are opening a search for an Assistant/Associate Professor in Conflict Analysis and Resolution within the next two weeks. The person hired for this position will support both the undergraduate program, as well as the graduate program, teaching courses, supervising research and mentoring students. We encourage women and minority candidates to apply. (See ICAR website by approximately mid November).

Programmatically, ICAR is on the move. Two new endowed professors have been appointed, two new junior faculty, and we are opening yet another search. We have a new Center to help us understand the connection between religion, conflict and diplomacy and we have a new undergraduate program, created in collaboration with other departments at George Mason. We have 25% more students than we did two years ago, and three times the external funding. This growth reflects the productivity of ICAR faculty and students, and it poses challenges for ICAR---how to maintain coherence, how to maintain traditions, how to grow strategically in ways that honors ICAR's past, as it builds its future. As we work to anchor ICAR in the policy community and in applied realms, we do not forget that we work to position conflict analysis and resolution itself, and in this way, we seek to add to the integrity of our collective field, as ICAR grows.

Sara Cobb
Director of ICAR

movement." Four months later, notwithstanding the capture of Saddam Hussein, attacks by the Iraqi insurgents have more than doubled. The resistance has become bolder, better organized, and more effective. More Americans, allied troops, Iraqis, and civilians of other nationalities have died than were killed in the invasion. The violence has spread to embrace new territories and targets, and the brutal "get tough" measures adopted by General Abizaid's occupying forces in "Operation Iron Hammer" are creating massive resentment even among those who detested Saddam Hussein.

Is there an alternative to this failed policy? Yes, say Bush regime strategists like Wayne Downing, recently Bush's deputy national security advisor and now chair of the new Center for Combating Terrorism at the U.S. Military Academy: Intensify the violence! Writing in the *Washington Post* on December 7, Downing applauds the American troops' new "willingness to enter known insurgent strongholds and directly engage the enemy even though these areas might be heavily populated." He hails the "destruction of insurgents' homes with smart bombs," and cheers the "sweep operations that round up all likely suspects and turn them over to trained Arab interrogators for determination of their true status." These "daring and risky" operations, says Downing enthusiastically, "are very much like those employed by the Israeli Defense Forces." What he does not mention is that the new U.S. tac-

tics include the use of assassination teams trained by these same Israeli Defense Forces. Evidently, unlike four chiefs of the Israeli Secret Service, Downing considers Israel's perpetual war against the Palestinian Intifadah a success.

One reads this apologia for current policy in Iraq with disbelief. Not only does it excuse wholesale violations of human rights, it also refuses to recognize that killing terrorist "suspects," blowing up family dwellings, dropping 1,000-pound bombs on urban neighborhoods, breaking down people's doors and carrying off their young men, establishing detention centers, and interrogating thousands of innocent people only fan the flames of hatred and revolt. The rationale for this strategy offered by U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and his colleagues is that the Iraqi insurgency is limited to a handful of Saddamist die-hards and foreign Islamists active in the "Sunni Triangle." But more careful observers understand that the resistance has broad and deep support in the Sunni community; that the country's Shiite majority despises the occupation ("No to Saddam, No to the Americans!" remains the popular slogan); and that the Kurds will continue to tolerate the U.S. presence only insofar as it advances their interest in Kurdish regional autonomy.

The Bush administration itself tacitly recognizes the depth and breadth of this opposition. This is why, in desperation, it has announced a seemingly dramatic new turn in policy. We will junk the hapless Governing Council and oversee the appointment

of a new "provisional government" that will later draft a constitution, hold elections, and introduce Iraq to Western-style democracy. No, no, says the chief Shiite leader, Ayatollah Ali Sistani. Let us have the elections now! But American satrap L. Paul Bremer refuses to agree…and so it goes, with Bush and his subordinates preaching democracy while the coalition authority handpicks an "Iraqi" government, suppresses anti-occupation political groups, closes down opposition newspapers, and decides in advance what sort of state and economy the Iraqis will be compelled to accept.

As the administration and its friends continue to remind us, Iraq is not Vietnam. But Vietnam was not "Vietnam" either, until the U.S. government's imperial ambitions, its support of corrupt warlords, suppression of independent opponents, and crude reliance on military force united virtually everyone who was not on the Defense Department payroll against the American occupation. The new policy of assassinating those accused of being midlevel resistance fighters is a replica of "Operation Phoenix," the CIA assassination program in Vietnam that is estimated to have taken 40,000 lives. Clearly, Iraq is Vietnam in the making.

A pseudo-problem: postoccupation "chaos"

Many who acknowledge the force of this argument have adduced an additional reason for declining to specify an exit strategy for coalition forces in Iraq: fear of the "chaos" that would

follow a U.S. withdrawal, with a divided society warring against itself, terrorists using the country as a base from which to wreak regional havoc, and the world concluding that the Americans lack the will to fight long wars far from home.

These grim scenarios contain a few grains of truth. Iraq is a deeply divided society—one in which the major groupings (Shiites, Sunnis, Kurds, Turkmen, et al.) have had virtually no opportunity to discuss with each other their fundamental grievances and needs or their visions for the future. It is also a highly militarized society, with ownership of guns and other weapons widespread, and semi-organized militias representing each major group and, in some cases, subgroups within the larger groups. And many people might well view an American withdrawal from Iraq as a Vietnam-style defeat.

The problem, however, is that the outcomes most feared by reluctant supporters of the Iraq War are more likely to eventuate as a result of continued U.S. occupation than as a result of withdrawal. I will show in a moment that, if our exit from Iraq is well conceived and conducted, these risks can be minimized. But it is the *occupation*, and the inevitable opposition to it by independence-loving Iraqis, that has plunged that nation into chaos! It is the occupation that prevents the Shiite, Sunni, and Kurdish communities from freely choosing their own representatives and negotiating with each other

about the shape of the future Iraq. It is the occupation that keeps the nation under arms, with the coalition authority now training interrogators and spies and arming Iraqi hit squads to conduct "dirty war" operations against suspected resistance fighters and sympathizers. It is the occupation that suppresses independent political organizations, blocks the development of civil society, and makes the imprisoned Saddam Hussein a hero to many who formerly despised him, just as it made Ho Chi Minh, another ruthless dictator, a hero to the Vietnamese.

To put it in a nutshell, the occupation of Iraq is not a solution to that nation's problems: it is the problem per se. And ending the occupation is the key to a principled and effective U.S. exit strategy.

Basic principles of an exit strategy

An American withdrawal from Iraq need not be a defeat for long-term U.S. interests—not if it is based on socioeconomic and political realities rather than fantastic Napoleonic dreams of exporting "democracy" at gunpoint. An exit strategy that makes sense, it seems to me, will have four main components:

• a declaration reflecting the intentions of the United States and Britain to withdraw their troops and political officials from the country by a date certain in the near future;
• the devolution, during this short transition period, of political

power and security functions to the Shiite, Sunni, and Kurdish communities;
• the immediate commencement of facilitated negotiations between recognized leaders of the major communities over the future of the Iraqi state and economy; and
• the formation of a regional organization to begin considering, among other things, the best methods of exploiting and using Iraq's enormous oil resources for the benefit of her people.

The most fundamental requirement of a workable exit strategy is acceptance of the principle that Iraq's fate as a nation, *including* the ownership and control of her oil resources, must be left to her people and, more generally, to the peoples of the Middle East/Gulf States region. The world's oil consumers, including the United States, must become participants in a new system based on fair and transparent negotiations with producers who have their own people's interests to consider. If the United States seeks to replace Britain as the imperial ruler of Iraq and the chief controller of her resources, the war will continue indefinitely, spreading to other lands and producing the nightmare scenarios wrongly *attributed* to an American-British withdrawal. On the contrary, if it becomes clear that this is *not* America's intention, the nightmares will begin immediately to dissolve— and there will be a real incentive for the producer nations to democratize themselves.

With these principles in mind, the U.S.-led coalition should announce that it will withdraw its troops from Iraq by June 1, 2004. Simultaneously, the coalition authority should begin to transfer political power on a regional basis to the peoples of the Shiite-dominated south, the Sunni-dominated center, and the Kurdish-dominated north of Iraq.

The United Nations, Arab League, or other accepted multinational authority should immediately offer to help oversee elections in each region, and to facilitate problem-solving negotiations between the dominant regional group and significant minorities (e.g., Shiites in the Baghdad region and Arabs and Turkmen in the north). At the same time, security functions can be transferred to existing militias, some of which already function as de facto regional armies, and others of which will require negotiations *inter se* in order to prevent internal competition and strife.

Some will decry this as the "balkanization" of Iraq. But conflict resolution specialists have learned that, in seriously divided societies, to recognize local identities and empower local authorities is often the necessary prerequisite to a just and workable integration of peoples. The peace processes implemented or under way in Mozambique, Sudan, Northern Ireland, Cyprus, and Sri Lanka, for

example, are all based on a combination of withdrawal by interfering Great Powers, recognition of local communities and leaders, integration of guerrilla forces into regular armies, and negotiation between leaders of the major communities over an acceptable form of national integration. Following an American withdrawal from Iraq, the risk of civil war can be minimized by making it clear that the Iraqis themselves, and no outside party, will decide whether to create a centralized, federated, or confederated state, and that the vast resources of this state will be for them to dispose of as they see fit.

Negotiations between representatives of all major religious and ethnic groups should therefore commence immediately, facilitated *not* by the United States or Britain, which lack the necessary impartiality and acceptability to the parties, but by a multinational or regional organization acceptable to the parties. The subjects to be negotiated will include all those issues currently being decided by fiat of Bremer and the coalition authority, ranging from the proper method of constructing an Iraqi constitution to the method and timing of national elections, the creation (or not) of unified armed forces, Iraq's relations with other states, and the extent of public or private ownership of economic resources. Americans may remember that, in their post-revolutionary

period, issues like these were decided exclusively by the representatives of the ex–colonial states, without foreign interference—one reason, perhaps, that a successful consensual result was finally reached.

Finally, as Johan Galtung and others have urged, steps should be taken immediately by the Iraqis and their neighbors to create a Middle East and Gulf States organization for security, cooperation, and development. This organization, which Israel would also be invited to join, would provide the ultimate answer to the terrorist threat in Iraq and in the region at large. Its basic mandate would be to aggregate its members' economic and political power, and to translate that increased prosperity and influence into programs for the development of all of the region's peoples, particularly the poorest, most vulnerable, and most disenfranchised.

This is the real answer to the nightmare scenario of Iraq as a terrorist base—the end of a century of Euro-American domination and the birth of real regional autonomy, with its indispensable concomitant: the right to decide one's own fate and make one's own mistakes. Like all strategies, this one is not risk-free. Nevertheless, nothing less than ending the occupation can extract the United States from its current no-exit dilemma. Nothing less deserves the name of liberation.

Headline Issues

The Fog of War (Written before the War on IRAQ began)
By Dennis Sandole, ICAR Faculty Member

President George W. Bush's strident march to war against Iraq would not be taking place if not for the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. Those attacks and their aftermath have unleashed a variety of emotional reactions among Americans and others: shock, outrage, frustration, even guilt and shame, plus a lingering sense of helplessness, anxiety, depression and fear. These reactions have all been compounded by an earlier anthrax scare and a month of sniper attacks in the Washington, DC, area, plus a recent increase in the color-coded terrorist alert system—with Americans stocking up on duct tape, plastic wrapping, bottled water, and the like.

What all these emotions have in common, besides many translating into a thirst for revenge, is the need to reduce the intensity of the experience and to avoid other painful situations. Hence, the tendency for Americans and others to expect their political leaders to do something to reduce and avoid the threat of terrorist attack.

The War on Terror is probably the first truly postmodern war, where "the Enemy" is not a traditional nation-state with a fixed territory and population, governed by an identifiable political leader. Instead, the people associated with the 19 young men who attacked us on 11 September are members of decentralized terrorist cells in many countries throughout the world.

Apart from the U.S.-led war in Afghanistan to topple the Taliban regime and destroy al Qaeda training infrastructure, the War on Terror has been very diffuse, irregular, and without closure. Despite the recent capture of 9/11 mastermind Khalid Sheik Mohammed in Pakistan, security forces still have not apprehended the "other guys" who did this to us. We do not even know if Osama bin Laden is dead or alive. For many Americans and others, therefore, the level of emotional upset and need for revenge have not been resolved by the War on Terror itself.

Enter a truly evil, ruthless despot: Saddam Hussein, a man who rules rough over his own people; has killed scores of Iraqi Kurds; invaded Kuwait in 1990 and subsequently, after the Persian Gulf War of 1991, attempted to assassinate President Bush's father, former President Bush. Saddam Hussein is a political leader truly "made to order" for emotionally upset Americans who need a more tradi-

tional enemy to target with aircraft, missiles, tanks, artillery, infantry, and the like: all the weapons that are difficult to employ in many of the 60 countries where al Qaeda is rumored to be active.

Enter the "Fog of War." President Bush, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, and Secretary of State Powell have successfully convinced a majority of Americans that a war on Iraq is a sensible component of the War on Terror, even though Saddam Hussein apparently had nothing to do with the attacks of 11 September or has any operational relationship with al Qaeda. He was not even supportive diplomatically, of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, which U.S. "allies" Pakistan and Saudi Arabia were.

Indeed, Pakistan—a nuclear armed state—is the location of the religious schools (madrassa) where the Taliban were created with U.S. support during the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980s. Saudi Arabia is the major exporter worldwide of Wahabism: a more traditional (and for some, "more pure") form of Islam. Wahabism informed the worldviews and identities of the 19 young men (15 of whom were Saudis) who perpetrated the acts of terrorism of 11 September 2001. It is also the basis for the beliefs and values of Osama bin Laden, himself a very wealthy Saudi. Ironically, the earlier spread of Wahabism was supported by the U.S.

as a bulwark against the Shiite fundamentalism of post-Shah Iran.

The question arises: How has President Bush been able to succeed in convincing a majority of Americans and others (e.g., Prime Minister Tony Blair of the United Kingdom) that a war against Iraq is a relevant component of the War on Terror?

Saddam Hussein is certainly evil, as he was when the U.S. supported him in his war against Iran during the 1980s. There is no doubt that he has chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction. But unlike Pakistan, India, Israel, North Korea and the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, he does not have nuclear weapons.

Still, Saddam Hussein is a truly negative character and, unlike the North Koreans whom President Bush has also included in the "Axis of Evil" designation, he is both an Arab and a Muslim (although not a fundamentalist). The 19 young men who perpetrated the 11 September attacks were also Arab and Muslim. In other words, there may be an element of stereotyping, "racial profiling" and even racism implied in the U.S. decision to go to war against Iraq, as Iraqis "look like" the terrorists of 11 September 2001.

The Bush Administration has successfully argued that some of Saddam Hussein's chemical and biological weapons may fall into the hands of al Qaeda, which may then use them against American targets. Curiously, the same case has not been made about Pakistan's nuclear weapons. The Bush Administration has also con-

vinced a majority of Americans that Saddam Hussein and al Qaeda are operationally connected: something that the French, Germans, and Russians, among others, continue to dispute.

Hence, against the background of the need for many Americans to achieve emotional closure on the 11 September attacks, Saddam Hussein seems to neatly fill the bill!

President Bush has recently gone further by arguing that his plans to conduct a major war against Iraq would lead to the democratization of Iraq and the Middle East, with implications for eventual peaceful relations between Israelis and Palestinians. We should not forget that Iraq possesses no nuclear weapons, has not threatened the U.S., and indeed has allowed UN inspectors to look for weapons of mass destruction on its territory. This stands in stark contrast to President Bush's intention to use diplomatic means to deal with North Korea: a state with which the U.S. is still officially at war, which does have nuclear weapons, is starting up its nuclear weapons program, and has expelled its UN inspectors.

How might President Bush's policies be perceived by the Russians, French, Germans, Arabs, and Muslims worldwide? He may indeed appear to be arrogantly and unilaterally leading the world's sole superpower to war against a developing country for access to its vast oil reserves. Given that Iraq's citizens are predominantly Arab and Muslim, how can that perception possibly lead to peace in the Middle East? Indeed, through the "law of unintended consequences,"

a U.S. war on Iraq—much like Israeli Prime Minister Sharon's war against Palestinians—will probably have the opposite effect: a worsening of the Middle East conflict and of Western-Arab/Muslim relations in general.

U.S. Generals Wesley Clark and Anthony Zinni (and earlier Secretary of State Powell) have argued that a war against Iraq is likely to "suck the oxygen" out of the War on Terror. Post-Taliban Afghanistan is a sobering example: parts of the country outside of Kabul are already falling back into the hands of the warlords and elements of the Taliban. Afghan President Hamid Karzai ended his recent visit to Washington with a plea to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee: "Don't forget us if Iraq happens."

Given that Pentagon war plans call for dispatching some 3000 precision-guided missiles and bombs to Iraqi targets, including in Baghdad, during the first 48 hours of the war, why are many Americans accepting what promises to be a very destructive war against civilians?

Perhaps President Bush is responding to the need for emotional closure on a national trauma, continuing felt helplessness and anxiety about the future. He is doing something to "those people" who "look like" the terrorists. This includes deploying thousands of U.S. forces in the Persian Gulf for the war that now seems inevitable.

A U.S. war against Iraq, involving the mobilization of thousands of reservists and national guardsmen and women from communities all across the country, is an excellent way to keep Americans who might otherwise be overwhelmed by fear and anxiety, focused on the same goals. War at this time may be the postmodern glue that holds Americans together, reinforced by the oldest maxim in the practice of politics: "When the natives are restless [because of economic and other problems], find an enemy and [threaten to] go to war!"

It is difficult for many Americans, emotionally and politically, to be critical of President Bush's decision to go to war against Iraq because that decision involves the deployment of American troops. To criticize the decision is to imply a lack of support for men and women who might be in harm's way, calling into question one's loyalty and patriotism: the ultimate trap of the "Fog of War."

A war against Iraq might well prove to be self-defeating. If Saddam Hussein succeeds in drawing the American and British forces into a "scorched earth," street-to-street, house-to-house campaign in Baghdad with many casualties, Americans might wonder how this all happened. There could be severe political and other consequences for those held responsible.

A war is also likely to be self-fulfilling. Once the 3000 precision-guided missiles and bombs start to assail, destroy, and traumatize the people of Iraq, we should not be too surprised if Arabs, Muslims, and others in the developing world experience a sense of ethnic, religious, class and other kinship with the Iraqi victims of superpower aggression. This has real potential to establish the very operational ties between Iraq and al Qaeda that the U.S. claims already exist. It could also aggravate further the growing bipolarity between Western (Judaic-Christian) and Islamic Civilizations.

Indeed, the messianic zeal of the Bush Administration in preparing to go to war against Iraq certainly borders on a crusade. It appears not to matter to President Bush what the UN inspectors do or do not find, or if there is UN Security Council authorization or not. This stridency has been matched by what many assume is Osama bin Laden's recent "civilizational rallying" of Muslims worldwide to help defend their Iraqi brothers against the "crusader enemy."

Adding further to the complexity of the postmodern world, where pre-emptive war is the strategy of choice for the world's sole superpower and therefore a "egitimate model," imagine that one or both of the remaining members of the "Axis of Evil," especially the nuclear-armed North Koreans, decided that they were next on the U.S. "hit list." What then?

Despite his best intentions to the contrary, President Bush may have become one of the world's most dangerous men.

Faculty Research

A North Korean Negotiation Model

Howon Jeong, ICAR Faculty Member

Introduction

In considering the very limited contact between North Korea and the West since the end of the Korean war, the negotiation on Pyongyang's nuclear weapons programs in 1994 offers a unique opportunity to analyze North Korean negotiation strategies. Though the agreements failed to be implemented, the outcome of the negotiation prevented another major military confrontation in the Korean peninsula a decade ago. Despite the dramatic nature of the event, few attempts have been made to undertake serious academic research on the negotiation process beyond journalistic accounts.

In approaching North Korean negotiating behavior, we can examine the values, norms and perceptions of the foreign policy elite in understanding their strategies at the negotiation table. Often an uncompromising North Korean bargaining position has proven to be a challenging issue to Western diplomats. Particular bargaining strategies can be explained in terms of negotiation culture. A conceptual understanding of North Korean behavior and motives will contribute to a better management of the current conflict.

Linking Culture to Negotiation Behavior

Culture, broadly defined as a set of shared meanings, is an important factor in understanding the process of negotiation (Cohen, 1991). According to one observation, Westerners tend to make unnecessary offenses in impending agreements by underestimating the foundation of their partners' attitudes (Plantey, 1982). Culture reflects conceptions of the world, and it can be embodied in symbols. Values are important standards used to evaluate the meanings and significance of events and objects. Thus culture helps people perpetuate knowledge and communicate with others. Professional and organizational norms can also prescribe proper approaches to resolving differences. In this sense, the negotiating culture "is a blend of civilizational, ethnic, national and professional experiences magnified by the individual's cultural background" (Kremenyuk, 1993: 48).

According to Fisher, culture impinges on negotiation in several ways. It conditions one's perception of reality, blocks out information inconsistent with culturally grounded assumptions, projects meaning onto the other party's words and actions, and interprets others' motives (Fisher, 1988). Studies on negotiation culture have examined negotiators' behavior in various settings, including international business deals.

Early research on the impact of culture on diplomatic relations focused on the role of incompatible languages and nonverbal communication in negotiations between the US and Japan (Kunihiro, 1972), cross cultural differences in a whole range of historical US-Japanese negotiations (Destler, et al. 1976), the interaction between Soviet and Japanese negotiating tendencies in a study of fisheries talks (Kimura, 1980), and a Swedish perspective on intercultural problems in aid negotiations with Tanzania (Elgstrom, 1990). Comparative studies have also been conducted on American, French, Japanese, and Mexican assumptions about the nature of the negotiating encounter, the importance of form, hospitality, and protocol, the choice of delegates, decision making style, methods of persuasion, and linguistic conventions (Fisher, 1988).

The choice of bargaining strategies, including presentation of positions, composition of proposals, exchange of concessions, and preparedness for compromise acquire certain cultural characteristics (Brett, et. al., 1998). Most research in the field generates the observation that while some negotiating cultures are complementary, actual negotiations can be hindered by linguistic, behavioral, and tactical dissonance (Anand, 1981). Different governing principles of organizations across hierarchical and horizontal

cultures may explain manipulative or cooperative approaches to changing environments. For instance, some argue that since the Japanese are skeptical of the value of elaborate ploys and stratagems, they believe that it is sufficient enough to convey the justice of their position as accurately as possible.

Some researchers stress the significance of a professional negotiation culture which has a transnational nature (Sunshine, 1990). Negotiators embrace certain values, basic beliefs, norms and customs which fit in a standardized analytical approach. Such professional culture may be traced back to training processes where diplomats are exposed to standard theories and practice. Though the commonalities are tempered by sectoral, institutional, and national cultures, negotiators tend to develop habits, assumptions, and selective perceptions oriented toward certain problem solving approaches.

While the existing literature offers some conceptual understanding, a comprehensive survey finds that research on culture in negotiation was developed in isolation from the mainstream field, and still remains a poorly defined area (Gelfand, 1996: 24). Most work is largely descriptive, and there is no systematic way of explaining differences in tactics with cultural variables. Various types of simulations and bargaining experiments identify differences in the adoption of such negotiation tactics as interruption and reciprocation across cultures (Adler, et

al., 1992). However, many laboratory experiments have been done on an ad hoc basis. They produced no cumulative theory of cultural characteristics which can be generalized. Overall, consensus does not seem to exist on which cultural factors are more important in understanding different negotiation strategies.

Given that the broad generalization of the concept of negotiation culture has a limited capacity in explaining specific patterns of behavior, it would be helpful if we put an emphasis on how negotiators' perception and norms interpreted from their belief systems affect negotiation strategies. Norms and values of political elites serve as important variables to understand negotiation strategies of authoritarian countries like North Korea whose public have little impact on policy making. Behavior can be understood in terms of the interaction between specific situations and subjective cultural elements such as values, norms, and attitudes. In this context, negotiation culture helps explain how negotiators' goals and cognition affect tactics and outcomes.

North Korean Negotiation Culture and Strategies
In considering the typical patterns of their diplomatic responses to major crises, we can identify Pyongyang's negotiation strategies. The leadership's perception of power in international relations influences the rationale behind the selection of ends and means. Rather than applying general categories of cultural patterns broadly

defined along such lines as being individualistic and collectivist (Gelfand, 1996), this research will focus on belief systems and professional values which affect perceptions of North Korean negotiators. By avoiding an over-generalized conceptualization of culture, this approach can offer a North Korean negotiation model which can be useful in interpreting specific situations.

An understanding of North Korean culture can be, in part, based on a conceptual construct derived from "Juche" ideology. Juche ideology has served as the governing principle of the country over the last several decades. It emphasizes self-reliance and anti-imperialism while reflecting on the egalitarian ideas of communism. The ideology has been used to explain their struggles against US intervention in the Korean war as well as the brutal Japanese occupation before and during World War II (Hunter, 1999). In the midst of the collapse of their traditional ally system, it still has a dominant impact on many aspects of North Korean society and offers the guiding principles for top political elites to give meaning to external events (Jeong, 1999). In fact, their refusal to accept such conditions as reconciliation with South Korea for US economic aid, in the midst of famine, reflects their long standing self-reliance principle which emphasizes resistance to foreign pressure.

The behavior of North Korean policy makers can also be explained in terms of their professional norms. Given the lack of public input into government policies, the top leadership has the final authority on major issues. Therefore, it is important to focus on the elements of North Korean negotiation culture which may influence the perceptions of foreign policy making elites. At the same time, institutional norms and interests cannot be ignored in the highly bureaucratic policy making process of North Korea. In contrast with the military and communist party ideologues opposing conciliatory postures toward the West, foreign ministry officials and economic bureaucrats tend to support less confrontational approaches.

According to some informal accounts, North Korean diplomats are believed to be well trained and have sophisticated manners and communication skills. Their style is often contrasted with the rigid image of the regime ruled by the communist party. Many North Korean foreign policy experts have concentrated on specific issues and countries for a number of years. Some of them, as trusted advisors, serve as a window on the outside world for the top leader. Given their training in analytical skills, they seem to have a less difficult time in reformulating their perceptions with changes in the international environment.

Negotiation over the North Korean Nuclear Programs
During the 1994 negotiation on the nuclear weapons programs, Pyongyang adopted both contentious and cooperative strategies in response to evolving conflict situations. The threats from the US government to impose economic sanctions were followed by the North Korean counter threat to escalate the crisis into a major war in the peninsula. Former US President Carter's visit to North Korea and his respect for the North Korean top leader offered face saving ways for Pyongyang to go back to the negotiation table. The North Korean negotiation position was, to a considerable degree, softened by the US agreement to delay negotiation sessions during the mourning period for their leader Kim Il Sung as well as other sensitive reactions by the US government, including President Clinton's condolence message to Pyongyang.

The significance of self-righteousness, national self-image, and honor in North Korean negotiation culture can explain their resistance to mere pressure that is not accompanied by concessionary measures. Compared with other countries in power imbalance situations, Pyongyang seems to be more resilient to pressures from the other side, and be more willing to use confrontational strategies in crisis

bargaining situations. The threat from a dominant power is likely to reinforce enemy images of their negotiation partners.

Difficulties in reaching an early settlement can be attributed to the North Korean refusal to negotiate from positions of weakness. In this situation, the hardening of their bargaining positions appears to be a strategic choice. On the other hand, proposals containing reciprocal concessions may more easily convince the leadership to switch to problem solving strategies. Self-respect and secure feelings are important to North Korean elites who face a hostile international environment. Face saving measures, therefore, are imperative especially in a crisis situation. In considering their expertise and knowledge, North Korean foreign policy elites are believed to be more interested in pragmatic approaches than dogmatic ideological positions. Their willingness to agree to freezing the nuclear programs in return for the US promise to build light water reactors reflects their sense of fairness, need for compromise, and ability to develop creative options.

Outreach Efforts

APT as a Reflection of the Field
By Linda Johnston, ICAR Faculty Member

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APT Team in the Ukraine

The domestic APT teams this year are a reflection of the current state of practice in the field of Conflict Resolution.

In every ICAR course, students work to develop the theory, research, and practice loop in the field. It is important for those in academia to do research and build theory, but then to follow that up with practice. If we don't do practice work, then it is important for us to build strong relationships with those who do practice. We are obliged to test our theories with real life applications.

One of the courses I teach is called Applied Practice and Theory (APT). This is one of the last courses the students take in their degree program. We utilize a medical model of teaching in order to train the students in fieldwork, i.e., we train them in the theory and research, and then supervise them closely with the practice work in the field. Part of the medical model is also that you plan an intervention, carry it out, and reflect on the results.

This field work affords them the opportunity to integrate their knowledge in a practice setting. The

students work in the field in teams of at least three over the course of one year. A vital part of taking part in field work is the knowledge the students learn from each other. For many of them, this is the first time they have the opportunity to work in the field and as part of a team.

I have learned five important things about teaching this course in the community:

1) First, the necessity to find good mentors and practitioners in the field. These need to be people who are doing good practice work themselves and are willing to also learn with the students. They need to be willing to learn good research and theory building from the students. In this manner, knowledge is co-built. The students will always, by the nature of the project, learn from the practitioners, but the learning should ideally be reciprocal.

2) Secondly, I have learned to speak to the students about the ethics of fieldwork. The possibility exists anytime people are doing fieldwork for their process to be "hijacked." I have learned to be aware of the fact that the person who calls you to do work in the field may want the students there to help maintain the status quo, which may include a power imbal-

ance. Part of the task I have as the supervisor of their field experiences is to help students work through the ethical dilemmas they face in the fieldwork. I also help them decide what types of work to get involved in, and how to hone the project into something that is accomplishable in one school year.

3) Thirdly, I have learned to set up practice opportunities for the possibility of double loop learning. Very simply put, in single loop learning, you try what you did in another way or do it the same way with more energy. Double loop learning involves asking yourself different questions. This double loop learning is especially important in cross-cultural settings where problems and solutions may be framed totally differently.

4) Fourthly, in all practice related work, there exists the need to balance real work in the field with a safety net for the students. This safety net can be that of the University and their status as student learners. It is important to set the students up for success in the field and with their learning experience. Professors, practitioners, and students become co-learners in the process. It is also possible to have practitioners become co-researchers in the process. In this way, the action-based research is ongoing and creates the theory, research, and practice loop.

5) And lastly, the last part of my job is to set up working relationships in the community where I can send different students year after year. These lasting relationships are built on a strong foundation of trust and cooperation. One team of students has the opportunity to take on a project where the last team left off.

Workshop on Films from the Americas
Pushpa Iyer, ICAR ABD

In April, 2003 I, along with Chris Mitchell organized a workshop, *Films from the Americas*. The workshop events, which consisted of film presentations followed by panel discussions, were scheduled over two Saturdays (April 19 and 26. 2003). The workshop titled, "On Taking a Stand," was the first ever of its kind to be presented by ICAR and was well attended by many from the Institute. Many other departments of the University were represented with a good number of those from the Spanish language department.

In keeping with the theme, the three films presented on the first day of the workshop were: *Threads of Hope* from *Chile*; *Inside the School of Assassins* on the School of Americas; and *The Official Story* from Argentina. The panelists were Dr. K C Soares, Dr. Esperanza Roman and Dr. Carlos Sluzki, with the discussion moderated by Dr. Wallace Warfield. On the second Saturday, the three films were: *Krik Krak!* from Haiti; *Dawn of Hope* from Guatemala and *Romero* from El

Salvador. Dr. Julie Christiansen, Ms. Linda Poole and Dr. Christopher Mitchell were the panelists that evening with Dr. Mitchell serving a dual role as moderator.

The films were based on true stories of individuals or groups of people, who exhibited great courage during times of conflict. They were very disturbing but at the same time conveyed a powerful message in the context of the environment around us today. The panelists provided excellent insights into the conflicts in the regions and also on the issues of role and impact of films in conflict.

The workshop was organized under the banner of the Latin American and Carribean Working group whose members assisted in the planning and development of the workshop. ICAR advisory board member, Dr. K.C. Soares, was particularly helpful in providing technical advise on organizing this event.

Faculty Books Published

Conflict: From Analysis to Intervention
Edited by Sandra Cheldelin, Daniel Druckman, and Larissa Fast

This major new textbook analyzes the emergent role of conflict analysis and resolution. Cheldelin, Druckman and Fast are international experts in the field of conflict. Covering theory, research and practice, the contributors to the book provide a comprehensive typology of conflict, as well as an in-depth analysis of the structural, strategic and cultural factors which influence conflict. They explore its management and resolution, paying particular attention to the concepts of negotiation, mediation and peace-building.

Part I Diagnosing Conflict
1. Typology – *Dennis J. D. Sandole*
2. Sources – *Richard Rubenstein*
3. Dynamics – *Tamra Pearson d'Estree*

Part II Influences and Context
4. Situations – *Daniel Druckman*
5. Identities – *Peter W. Black*
6. Culture – *Kevin Avruch*
7. Structure – *Howan Jeong*
8. Institutions – *Richard Rubenstein*

Part III Intervening in Conflict
9. Negotiation – *Daniel Druckman*
10. Informal Roles – *Johannes M. Botes*
11. Mediation and Arbitration – *Sandra Cheldelin*
12. Problem Solving – *Christopher Mitchell*
13. Facilitation and Consultation – *Sandra Cheldelin and Terrence Lyons*
14. Structual Transformations – *Johannes M. Botes*
15. Peace Building – *Howan Jeong*
16. Toward Integrated Knowledge – *Daniel Druckman*

Aristotle's Children: How Christians, Muslims, and Jews Rediscovered Ancient Wisdom and Illuminated the Dark Ages

Written By Rich Rubenstein, ICAR Faculty Member

This book documents the intellectual explosion that transformed Europe in the Middle Ages and follows a set of ideas as they course through the west. These ideas triggered student riots and heresy trials, prompted Pope Innocent III to recognize the Franciscan and Dominican orders, and set the stage for today's rift between reason and religion.

This new perspective came from Aristotle. His work, like the rest of Greek culture, had been lost in the centuries after the fall of Rome, when the Greek language was forgotten. But in the Muslim World, the wisdom of the Greeks was never lost and contributed to the flowering of Islamic culture.

Then in the twelfth century in Toledo, Spain, groups of Muslim, Jewish and Christian scholars collaborated on translating the ancient classics; and ideas long forgotten galvanized Europe, turning Western thinking

away from the supernatural world and toward the world of nature. With their optimistic view of human nature, these concepts sparked fierce controversies in the universities and caused major changes in the Catholic Church.

Rubenstein, author of *When Jesus Became God,* takes the reader back in time to the translation center in Toledo and to the great universities in Paris, Padua and Oxford. He shows how the Catholic Church adopted this new philosophy and struggled to reconcile science and religion and how Western thinking was set on the path it has followed ever since.

Aristotle's Children
An Interview with Richard Rubenstein

[This is a summary of an interview which aired on Public Access Radio in Northern Virginia on September 2, 2003.]

Q: The subtitle of your new book refers to "ancient wisdom" that was somehow rediscovered in the Middle Ages by Christians, Muslims, and Jews. What was that ancient knowledge, and how was it brought to light?
Rubenstein: In the eleventh and twelfth centuries, Christian knights reconquered most of Spain from the Muslim rulers who had occupied it for more than four hundred years. Close behind them came Roman Catholic priests and scholars, and it was they who made the most significant intel-

lectual "find" in Western history – perhaps in world history. The Europeans, whose civilization was quite undeveloped compared to that of the Muslims, were amazed to discover that their highly cultured enemies had translated all of Aristotle's surviving works into Arabic – about 3,000 pages of advanced natural science, social science, and philosophy that had been lost to the West for centuries.

Not only that, the libraries of Spain also contained legendary works by other Greek thinkers as well as commentaries and updates on all this material by Arab and Jewish philosophers such as Avicenna, Averroes, and Moses Maimonides. Wise churchmen recognized the value of these discoveries and organized multicultural teams to translate them into Latin. In Spain, Provence, and Sicily, Roman Catholic and Orthodox Christians worked with Muslim and Jewish scholars to make this treasure-trove of learning available to Europeans.

Q: What was the initial impact of these translations?
Rubenstein: The Christians' first reaction was awe and wonder. Educated Europeans (most of them clerics) couldn't wait to get their hands on these manuscripts – and it's easy to see why. Aristotle and his commentators had written on every subject imaginable, from biology and physics to metaphysics, logic, ethics, politics,

and even art. The West was just awakening from that long period of confusion and stagnation people call the Dark Ages, and students flocking to the new universities demanded access to the "new learning."

Q: But the Church operated these universities. How did Catholic leaders feel about all this new material?
Rubenstein: Early in the thirteenth century, they became terrified by it. After all, Aristotle was no Christian. His God (the "Unmoved Mover") was an abstract principle, not the personal God of Scripture who created the universe and who intervenes in history. The Philosopher thought that nature operated according to its own laws, that humans were essentially reasonable creatures, and that they could understand the universe and live happy, useful lives without the aid of a higher power. When a few Christian scholars used his ideas to reach wildly heretical conclusions, the bishop of Paris banned all of Aristotle's "nature books" at Europe's leading university, the University of Paris.

Q: And did the ban stick?
Rubenstein: Not at all! With the West coming alive economically and culturally, and there was no way that young people seeking an education could be stopped from reading these books. A decade or two after it went into effect, the ban became a dead letter, and by the 1250s, Aristotle's complete works were required reading in all the major universities. What accelerated this process was the discovery by members of the new Catholic orders, the Dominicans and

Franciscans, that Aristotle's ideas could be tremendously useful in the fight against anti-Catholic heretics like the Cathars of southern France. Far-sighted conservatives like Pope Innocent III therefore redefined the problem. Innocent recognized that the Church could not turn its back on the new science and philosophy without forfeiting its claim to be the intellectual leader of Europe. The issue wasn't Aristotle or no Aristotle. It was how to reconcile the truths of Aristotelian science with the fundamental doctrines of Christianity.

Q: Were these opposed worldviews really reconcilable?
Rubenstein: The discussion of that question hasn't stopped since the thirteenth century! Some of medieval Christendom's greatest minds, like Peter Abelard and Thomas Aquinas, thought so. Others, such as Bernard of Clairvaux and William of Ockham, strongly disagreed. I wrote this book because I wanted to tell the story of these great debates, fought out on such a high intellectual level by such colorful, principled, God-intoxicated characters. The issues that concerned them most – the eternity of the universe, man's capacity for happiness, the autonomy of nature, the immortality of the soul – are still undecided. But the Church's capacity to manage these conflicts, which I hadn't expected to discover at all, made Europe's first "scientific revolution" possible. Galileo and Isaac Newton, even Francis Bacon and Rene Descartes, were not so much the enemies of scholastic science as its heirs.

Q: You are a professor of conflict resolution and public affairs. What lessons do you draw from this story?
Rubenstein: Here are a few. First, the cultural battles that occupied educated Europeans in the High Middle Ages resemble in many ways the struggles that modern non-Western peoples are going through now. Europeans then wanted to know how they could accept the best and truest ideas coming to them from the Arab East without losing their identity as Westerners and Christians. That is what people are doing, vis a vis the West, in the Islamic world, South Asia, East Asia, and elsewhere today. But medieval Europeans had the great advantage that no other power was in a position to dominate them militarily or dictate to them economically and culturally. We need to give other peoples the same freedom that we once enjoyed and used to re-create our own civilization.

Second, writing this book turned my head around with respect to the relations between faith and reason, religion and science, in the modern world. I realized that the "primal myth" of modernism, the story of Galileo confronting his backward, superstition-ridden religious accusers, obscured an earlier, equally important story: the origin of modern rationalist thinking in the medieval universities. One thing history does is to provide us with alternative universes – it shows us that the social world we inhabit is not eternal, and that there

Faculty Updates

are other ways of organizing our affairs. One sees that the current split between a religiously inspired "culture of the heart" and a science-based "culture of the head" is not inevitable. Once upon a time, spirit and reason engaged in a mutually enriching dialogue. That time may come again.

Finally, the conflicts described in ARISTOTLE'S CHILDREN were never "resolved," if that means that they disappeared. Because they raise such fundamental issues about God, nature, and humanity, such conflicts are seldom terminated permanently – but they *can* be humanized. The Middle Ages were in many ways a violent, intolerant era. But one of my favorite stories of the period is about those two great adversaries, Bonaventure and Thomas Aquinas,

the Franciscan conservative and the Dominican liberal, who disagreed vehemently about how to reconcile Christian and Aristotelian ideas.

One evening, Thomas and a young associate of his came to Bonaventure's study to continue a debate that had pitted the two men against each other earlier that day at the University of Paris. They found Bonaventure, who was writing his biography of Saint Augustine, lost in a sort of trance or "rapture," with his manuscript sitting upon his desk. For several minutes, Thomas observed the older man staring intently into space at something unseen. Then he turned to his associate, his finger raised to his lips. "Shhh," he whispered. "Let us leave one saint to contemplate another."

Can we recognize, in a time of increasing religious passion and intolerance, that our ideological adversaries are no less human than we – that, so far from being icons of evil, some of them may even be saintly? Stories like this do not provide scientific answers to such questions. Still, they give us hope.

Kevin Avruch

Kevin Avruch continues as co-principal investigator on the Walsh Visa Program for Northern Ireland and the six border counties of the Republic of Ireland, and as a member of ICAR's Zones of Peace research team. His recent publications include "Type I and Type II Errors in Culturally Sensitive Conflict Resolution Practice," in the *Conflict Resolution Quarterly* 20(3):351-371; and the chapter on "Culture" for the new ICAR textbook, *Human Conflict: From Analysis to Intervention*. His article, "Culture and Negotiation Pedagogy," originally published in the *Negotiation Journal* 16(4) was reprinted in the collection *Understanding Negotiation*, edited by M.L. Nelken, aimed primarily at students of law. The new online edition of the Human Relations Area Files, the *eHRAF Collection of Ethnography*, published his contribution, "Cultural Summary: Israelis," in 2003. A review of *Social Identity, Intergroup Conflict, and Conflict Reduction* (R. Ashmore et al.) was published in *Contemporary Sociology*. *The Middle East Journal* published his review of Marc Gopin's *Holy War, Holy Peace*.

Avruch presented a paper at the annual meeting of the Washington D.C. chapter of the Association for Conflict Resolution, "Integrating Ideas of Culture, Ethnicity, and

Multiculturalism into Thinking about ADR." In addition, he was invited to lecture to students and faculty at the Sabanci University's program in Conflict Analysis and Resolution, in Istanbul, Turkey. The Harvard Negotiation Law Review, the Program on Negotiation, and the Consortium on Global Leadership invited him to speak and moderate a panel on "Overcoming Cultural Barriers in International Negotiations: Success in Diplomacy and International Transactions." The Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, in Geneva, invited him to speak at its Annual Meeting of the Humanitarian Negotiators' Network, in Talloires, France, on the topic, "Culture as Context, Culture as Communication: Considerations for Humanitarian Negotiators."

Sandra Cheldelin

Last academic year and through the summer Sandra Cheldelin has been busy with several writing and consulting projects in addition to coordinating five externally funded practice projects (some highlighted in this issue).

The ICAR textbook *Conflict: from Analysis to Intervention* (co-edited with Dan Druckman and Larissa Fast) is now in print. She has authored chapters on mediation and arbitration, and—with Terrence Lyons— facilitation and consultation. (It is available

through Continuum Press or on *amazon.com* with proceeds to support ICAR graduate students.) Her book *Conflict Resolution* (co-authored with Ann Lucas) has been submitted to Jossey Bass publishers and should be in print late fall or early winter. It is part of a series for academic administrators in higher education. Cheldelin was also highlighted in the faculty section of the *Chronicle for Higher Education* "Academic Therapists" (May 21, 2003) discussing the increased need for and use of conflict resolvers in the academy. She has presented her work at the annual meetings of the American Association for Higher Education "Conflict Analysis and Resolution in Higher Education" and the Dispute Resolution section of the American Bar Association "Lessons Learned "Exporting Mediation: Confessing Sins and Exploring Best Practices."

Along with writing and consulting, Cheldelin is principal or co-principal investigator on several projects. Two are collaborative partnerships—funded by the Department of State—with Tbilisi State and National Taurida Vernadsky Universities to establish conflict resolution academic programs and capabilities in the Republic of Georgia and Ukraine, respectively. Three other projects are working in the community to address post 9.11 issues, funded by the Community

Resilience Projects of Fairfax and Loudoun Counties (with FEMA grants), and the Community Relations department of the Freddie Mac Corporation.

She continues to teach Conflict in Organizations and has designed a new course for the fall on Gender and Conflict.

Daniel Druckman

Daniel Druckman had a busy year. In addition to the long-awaited co-edited ICAR book entitled *Conflict*, he had articles in several Journals, including International Negotiation and the Journal of Conflict Resolution, and book chapters. He was also appointed an Associate Editor of the Journal Group Decision and Negotiation. The highlight of the year, however, was the lifetime achievement award that he received in June from the International Association for Conflict Management (IACM) at the annual meeting in Melbourne, Australia. Icing on this cake was provided by another IACM award for the outstanding article of 2001 ("Turning Points in International Negotiation," in the Journal of Conflict Resolution). He presented the keynote address at the meeting (to appear in the International Journal of Conflict Management) as well as participated on three panels – one honoring the work of John Burton, another on his e mediation research, and a third on organizational inertia. Following this meeting, he and his wife traveled around the world, stopping in Istanbul where he delivered another keynote address to the Group Decision and Negotiation section of EURO/INFORMS. Later in the summer he participated as a member of a

senior faculty panel that conducted a research incubator for junior faculty at the Academy for Management meeting in Seattle. In the Fall he participated (with Sara Cobb) in the PON conference on Critical Moments in Negotiation. (The papers will appear in 2004 in the Negotiation Journal.) The year will be capped by presentations at the first Biennial Conference on Negotiation held in Europe (Paris) in December A busy year indeed which also included progress on his textbook, "Doing Research: Methods of Inquiry in Conflict Analysis," to be published by Sage and several Lynch chair projects. He looks forward to carrying this momentum into 2004.

Mark Goodale

Mark Goodale has been very busy during his first semester at ICAR. He worked at developing research initiatives in Iraq, Eastern Europe, Norway, and here in Fairfax County. He is writing two books: The Dilemma of Modernity: Bolivian Encounters with Law and Liberalism, and Toward a Critical Anthropology of Human Rights. He chaired a session at the 2003 American Anthropological Association meetings in Chicago entitled "Emerging Modalities of Globalizing Legal Forms." He taught the first human rights course in recent years at ICAR, "Human Rights Theory and Practice in Comparative Perspective." And he made the final preparations for his spring leave of absence as a Fulbright Scholar to Romania on a project entitled "Human Rights, Democratization, and the Rule of Law in Romania," a research and teaching grant that will lead to policy recommendations to the Romanian government on ways to

reform legal and political institutions in preparation for accession to the European Union in 2007.

Marc Gopin

As director of the newly created Center for World Religions, Diplomacy and Conflict Resolution, Marc planned and helped coordinate an inaugural reception on the main campus that was widely attended, with some guests coming from as far away as Chicago. Marc just finished work on a book manuscript entitled *Healing the Heart of Conflict*, to be published next year by Rodale Press. Gopin engaged a group of American Jews and Arabs in Chicago on peace making, and met with significant Arab leaders. He worked together with Reverend John Henderson on collaborative activities that would influence the evangelical community regarding peace in the Middle East, and appeared with him on an evangelical cable network, Lessee Productions in South Bend, Indiana, that went to millions of households in the Middle East. Gopin also continues collaborative planning with Chris Seiple, newly appointed President of the Institute for Global Engagement, an evangelical think tank. He then traveled to the Nato Defense College in Rome and lectured on religion, conflict, terrorism, and conflict resolution alternatives. Marc was interviewed for a public television film being produced by Jerry Krell, on religion and peacemaking, and is engaged in discussions on possible further collaborations. Marc continued developing relationships with select members of Congress on contributions of religion to ameliorating the Palestinian/Israeli conflict. He also lectured at Georgetown

University, American University, and the Washington College of Law. Gopin's Center for World Religions, Diplomacy and Conflict Resolution cosponsored with Facing History and Ourselves a ten day global internet conference on the subject of religion, conflict, peace and global citizenship in the future. As board member of *A Different Future*, an interfaith alliance for peace in the Middle East, Gopin worked on the methods of engagement with Washington regarding the road map for peace in Israel and Palestine. Gopin has also engaged in several planning sessions with Initiatives of Change on planned interfaith dialogue encounters in Morroco and Switzerland. In addition, he has been engaged with and planning together with the Tannenbaum Center a dialogue in Amman. Gopin continues to advise and support with new approaches key religious peace activists in the Israeli/Palestinian conflict, conservatives as well as progressives, both at the grassroots level and those who are engaged with the political leadership. Gopin delivered a keynote lecture to approximately 400 mediators in Georgia, and responded to a panel at the American Academy of Religon in Atlanta devoted to his recent book, *Holy War*, as well as to Charles Kimball's book. He was interviewed by Bloomberg News. A chapter of his appeared in the newly published *The Future of Peace in the Twenty-First Century*.

Howon Jeong

Howon Jeong is completing his newest book *Peace Building: Processes and Strategies* to be published by Lynne Reinner. He contributed an article on conflict in divided societies,'to *Encyclopedia of Life Support Systems* (UNESCO Social Science Series). His chapters on third party roles in peace building and structural sources of conflict were included in the ICAR textbook. He chaired a panel on human security and made a presentation on application of human security to peace building at the International Studies Association Convention last year. As part of a Human Security Project, he also facilitated discussion at a meeting held at Columbia University last June. He has been actively engaged in editorial activities as a chief editor of *International Journal of Peace Studies* sponsored by the International Peace Research Association. He was also occasionally involved in editorial advisory functions as a senior consulting editor for *Peace and Conflict Studies* journal. He was also a consultant for the European Commission's Research Programme on 'Citizens and Governance in the Knowledge Based Society'.

Linda Johnston

Linda M. Johnston will be remaining at ICAR as a Visiting Professor for the next two years. She is the Field Program Coordinator of the Applied Practice and Theory Program. Last academic year, four APT teams successfully completed their year-long projects in the field: Fairfax Library Dialogue Group, National Mediation Board, Fairfax Schools, and the Ukraine Research Project. Linda took five of her students to Ukraine with her in March. This year promises the same coordination between the ICAR and the larger community in terms of the proposed fieldwork. Johnston continues to teach Conceptions of Practice, Third Party Roles, and Community Conflict, in addition to the APT classes.

Linda is on the Executive Board of the International Peace Research Association (IPRA). As part of her work with IPRA, Linda serves on the Grants Committee, which dispenses small grants for field-based Peace Research, and she administers the Senesh Fellowship which is a Fellowship for women in the third world who wish to pursue graduate education in Peace-related work or Conflict Resolution.

Johnston presented papers at two conferences this past year. She presented a paper on "Justice, Reconciliation, and Revenge" at the Network of Communities for Peacemaking and Conflict Resolution (NCPCR) in Atlanta, Georgia; and "The Role of the University Towards the Community: Students' Field Placement in Conflict Settings" at the World Mediation Forum in Buenos Aires, Argentina.

Terrence Lyons

Terrence Lyons is continuing his research on the relationships between democratization and conflict resolution, with a particular emphasis on the processes of post-conflict peace-building following civil wars. Recent publications on this theme include "The Role of Postsettlement Elections" in Stephen John Stedman, Elizabeth Cousens, and Donald Rothchild, eds., *Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2002) and "Elections to End Conflict: War Termination, Democratization, and International Policy," in Edward R. McMahon and Thomas Sinclair, eds., *Democratic Institution Performance: Research and Policy Perspectives* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger/Greenwood, 2002).

He is also developing a proposal to begin researching the roles played by diaspora groups in conflict and conflict resolution. He participated in a workshop on "Globalization, Territoriality, and Conflict," organized by the Institute for International, Comparative, and Area Studies of the University of California, San Diego, where he presented some preliminary ideas on how diaspora groups sometimes promote conflict resolution while other times can escalate conflicts and make them more protracted. He will participate in a second workshop in San Diego in late 2003 to present a more fully developed research paper on globalization, diasporas, and conflict resolution.

Lyons continues his involvement with the ICAR Africa Working Group and is working with Chris Mitchell and other ICAR graduate students to finalize a report on the Ethiopian Extended Dialogue. In 2003 he traveled to Khartoum and southern Sudan to assess the status of the peace process that is trying to end that protracted civil war.

Chris Mitchell

While on a field trip to Colombia in connection with ICAR's "Local Zones of Peace in Colombia" Project, Dr Chris Mitchell chaired and was the main speaker in a "Catedra Abierta" [Open Space - for Discussion of Local Problems]. The Catedra took place in the municipio of RioNegro, 25 kilometres from Medellin in Antioquia. It was hosted by the Instituto Popular de Capitacion, the Corporacion Corazonverde and the municipios of RioNegro and Marinilla.

The focus of discussion was on "The Treatment of Conflict in the Context of Open War", and what local people might be able to do to mitigate some of the effects of the widespread fighting that has resulted from the breakdown of the Colombian peace process in February 2002. This has left local populations vulnerable to attack from many quarters. The discussion was lively, ran over time and covered a wide range of topics and questions, from the morality of proposed talks with paramilitary forces to the reasons for the failure of the Pastrana peace process.

Agnieszka Paczynska

Agnieszka Paczynska continues to develop the Globalization and Conflict initiative. She is revising a manuscript that analyzes the response of labor groups to economic restructuring programs and their contentious interaction with governments implementing structural adjustment policies. The manuscript focuses primarily on the experiences of Egypt, Poland, Mexico and the Czech Republic. She has recently finished a chapter on union struggles in Cairo after ten years of economic liberalization which will appear in an edited volume and has completed an article that explores the impact of economic reforms on political and civic participation in Poland. She is beginning a new project that explores the challenges and opportunities that workers have encountered in an era of both growing economic integration and differentiation. In particular, it will explore how labor has sought to fashion transnational linkages and how these newly emerging patterns of international networking influence the emergence and/or resolution of conflicts at the state level.

Last year, she was a participant in the Workshop on Contentious Politics at the University of Maryland where she presented her paper entitled

"Contesting Labor Law in Egypt" and also served as a discussant for a number of papers. In September 2002 she presented a paper entitled "Economic Reforms and Political Participation in Poland," at the American Political Science Association meeting and "Middle East Political Science –Where To?" at the November 2002 meeting of the Middle East Studies Association. During summer of 2003 she traveled to Poland to observe the referendum on accession to European Union and to conduct research for a paper she will be presenting in November 2003 at the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies on how trade unions have sought to ensure their representation during the accession negotiations. She is also completing a paper on globalization and conflict that she will present at the October ICAR conference.

She is also continuing to develop new courses on globalization. Last spring semester she taught the first of these new courses, "Globalization and Social Movements." During the 2003-04 academic year she will be teaching two new courses at ICAR, "Globalization and International Conflict," and "Globalization and Domestic Conflict." In addition she developed a new undergraduate course, "Globalization, Peace and Conflict," which she will be teaching in the spring. This course is part of the new Global Affairs major.

Richard Rubenstein

Prof. Rich Rubenstein's new book, *Aristotle's Children: How Christians, Muslims, and Jews Rediscovered Ancient Wisdom and Illuminated the Dark Ages*, was published in October by Harcourt Books. In a starred review, Publishers Weekly calls it a "dazzling historical narrative," remarking that "Rubenstein's lively prose, his lucid insights, and his crystal-clear historical analyses make this a first-rate study in the history of ideas." Rich addressed the Washington, D.C. chapter of Phi Beta Kappa on the subject of the book in June 2003, and lectured on it in the fall in New York, Chicago, Minneapolis, Dayton, and DC. In November, Rich appeared on National Public Radio's Kojo Nnamde show to discuss the lessons that the story teaches for the resolution of contemporary religious conflicts. The book is illustrated by ICAR masters student and practicing artist David Toohey. It has been made a featured offering of the History Book Club and Quality Book Club, and arrangements have been made to publish it in Greece, the Netherlands, Brazil, and Korea.

Since last March, Rich has also spoken and written at length about the war in Iraq, the American Empire, and conflict resolving alternatives to current policies based on military force. In April 2003, he lectured on "The New American Empire and Conflict Resolution" at the Free University of Berlin, and in July, he addressed the Jack Kent Cooke Fellows of Georgetown University on the same subject. His op-ed article advocating the withdrawal of U.S. forces and advocating peaceful facilitation of intra-Iraqi conflicts was published in *USA Today* on August 21, and he appeared on several radio and television talk shows to discuss the issues further. During the fall term, he was interviewed by the Hokkaido Shimbun newspaper, spoke to the Soka Gakkai Institute of Northern Virginia, appeared on Fox Cable News, gave the Richard M. Pfeffer Memorial Lecture at the Progressive Action Coalition in Baltimore, and lectured at Montgomery College in Takoma Park, Maryland on conflict resolution approaches to global peacemaking. He also presented a Brown Bag seminar at ICAR on "Religion and Empire."

Rich's work on terrorism continued with the publication of "The Psycho-Political Causes of Terrorism" in *The New Global Terrorism: Characteristics, Causes, Controls*, edited by Charles W. Kegley, Jr. (Prentice-Hall, 2003). His current scholarly work includes a major article on "Current Research on Religion and Conflict" for the forthcoming ICAR conference, and the preparation of a Transatlantic Conference on News Media Coverage of Violent Conflicts: European and American Perspectives, now being planned for March 2004 at the European Parliament in Brussels. Rich will be on sabbatical leave in spring term 2004 working on a new book on the prophetic tradition and conflict resolution.

Dennis Sandole

Dr. Dennis Sandole has been very active in writing and presenting on the issues of conflict resolution. In February 2003, Dr. Sandole attended the Annual Convention of the International Studies Association (ISA) in Portland, Oregon, where he presented, "Complexity and Conflict Resolution" at the Panel on "Global Complexity: Agent-Based Models in Global and International Studies." Dr. Sandole also acted as a discussant for the Panel on "International Conflict Resolution in the 21st Century: Challenges and Opportunities Post-September 11."

In April 2003, Dr. Sandole attended the Faculty and Community Development Workshop on "Educating for Peace in Conflict-Ridden Societies," sponsored by the U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP), at the Center for Conflict Management, Kennesaw State University, Kennesaw, Georgia. Dr. Sandole presented on "Conflict and Education—The Linkages."

During May 16-19, 2003, Dr. Sandole presented "Combating Crime in South East Europe: An Integrated, Co-ordinated, Multi-Level Approach," at the 4th Reichenau Workshop of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) Consortium Study Group on Regional Stability in South East Europe, at Reichenau, Austria.

Dr. Sandole traveled to Berlin in July 2003, as a speaker for the U.S. State Department, where he met with foreign policy staffers of the German "Greens" Party and the Social Democratic Party. Dr. Sandole discussed the war in Iraq and its implications for the Middle East peace

process and global war on terrorism. Also in July, Dr. Sandole met with senior research associates of the "Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik" (SWP)—Germany's leading thinktank for advising the Federal Government—where he discussed the war in Iraq and its implications for the Middle East peace process and global war on terrorism.

July was a very busy month for Dr. Sandole. On July 14 he presented "After Saddam: Scenarios for the Middle East and the War on Global Terrorism," at the "Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung", in Munich, Germany—the main thinktank for Bavaria's Christian Socialist Party. On July 15, Dr. Sandole presented "Conflict Resolution and the New Terrorism" at the German-American Institute in Heidelberg, Germany. Dr. Sandole met on July 16, with senior research associates and invited guests of the Bonn International Conversion Center (BICC) in Bonn, Germany, where he discussed conceptual approaches to understanding and dealing with the new terrorism. On July 17, Dr. Sandole presented "The Role of the U.S. in the Post-Saddam World" for faculty and students of the Department of Political Science, University of Cologne, in Cologne, Germany.

Dr. Sandole conducted a 2-day Workshop on "Theory and Practice in Conflict Resolution: Implications for the Global War on Terror," in August 2003, at the premier university-based peace and conflict studies program in Southeast Asia: the Research and Education for Peace (REP) Unit of the Universiti Sains Malaysia in Penang, Malaysia (where Dr. Sandole has sent

4 ICAR interns in recent years). Also in August 27-29, 2003, Dr. Sandole attended and participated in the USIP Workshop on "Peace Education in Indonesia," at the Asian Institute of Management (AIM), in Manila, Philippines, where he presented on "Complexity and Conflict."

Dr. Sandole has been granted a Fulbright Award as Visiting Professor of International Relations at the Diplomatic Academy in Vienna, Austria where, during March-June 2004, he will teach graduate courses in "War, Violence, and Conflict Resolution", "Peacebuilding", and "Simulation Workshop on Negotiation and Mediation in Complex Conflicts."

Dr. Sandole has published a number of times in 2003, to include "The Nature of Warfare in the 21st Century", in "Conflict Resolution", in The Encyclopedia of Life Support Systems (EOLSS), "Violent Ethnocentrism and Conflict Intractability: Puzzles and Challenges for 3rd Party Intervenors" in Peace and Conflict Studies, "Combating Crime in Southeastern Europe: An Integrated, Coordinated, Multi-Level Approach", in Crushing Crime in South East Europe: A Struggle of Domestic, Regional and European Dimensions, "Validating Simulation-based Models of Conflict" in Simulation & Gaming, and "Typology." in Conflict: From Analysis to Intervention.

Dr. Sandole also contributes frequently to electronic and print media on the relevance of conflict resolution theory and practice to developments across the world, his most recent being a letter to the editor published in The Washington Post Magazine on August 10, 2003.

Carlos Sluzki

Prof. Carlos E. Sluzki has just been honored as a Fellow at the American College of Psychiatrists and at the American Academy of Psychoanalysis and Dynamic Psychiatry, and as a Distinguished Fellow at the American Psychiatric ssociation. His most recent publications include "Families Imploding: The Loosening of the social fabric and the decline of social responsibility at the dawn of the 21st. Century." J. Family Psychotherapy, 14 (1), 2003; "Humiliation, social crisis, and social networks: A Conversation" Sistemas Familiares (in Spanish), 2003; "The process toward reconciliation." Chapter in A. Chayes and M. Minow, Eds.: Imagine Coexistence: Restoring Humanity after Violent Ethnic Conflict. San Francisco, Jossey-Bass, 2003; and "Censorship Looming", an Editorial at the American Journal of Orthopsychiatry , 73(2) , 2003. He was recently in Kosovo as member of the core team of the Kosovar Family Professional Education Collaborative Project, carried out conjointly by the University of Kosovo, the University of Illinois at Chicago and the American Family Therapy Academy, and in Italy, where he conducted conferences and workshops.

Wallace Warfield

Professor Wallace Warfield was active in three areas over the summer. In the teaching realm, Warfield, along with ABD doctoral student, Mara Schoeny, taught an experiential learning course, "Conflict Resolution Ethics: Justice, Decision-making, and Professionalism" for concluding undergraduate students under the auspices of New Century College.

Professor Warfield contributed an article for the Missouri Journal on Dispute Resolution, that will be one of several devoted to a critical examination of whether one or a corpus of conflict resolution theory is generalizable across conflict domains, or if the specificity of domains defies such generalization. A second article, "Racial and Gender Profiling In Conflict Intervention: Threat or Opportunity?", co-authored with Susan Dearborn, a Seattle-based mediator, parts the veil surrounding the little-discussed issue of profiling in mediation. The article will appear in the Association for Conflict Resolution magazine early this fall.

Professor Warfield submitted two research proposals that will focus on local conflict issues. One will have an emphasis on restorative justice, examining the broader community sociology embracing crime and victim-offender reconciliation. If funded, Warfield will be working with Phyllis Turner Lawrence, a lawyer and authority on restorative justice and Heather Scofield, concluding ICAR Masters student, who has also worked in this area. A second proposal comes at the request of the Arlington County Fire Department, seeking assistance in designing and implementing a process that will involve residents from affected jurisdictions in dialogue and decision-making around the placement of new fire stations in various locations in the county. ICAR will be joined by adjunct faculty from the School for Public Policy who will design a facilities distribution/population density study. Professor Warfield continues his association with Professors Chris Mitchell and Kevin Avruch on the on-going Zones of Peace research project in Colombia.

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