

**George Mason University**

**Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution (ICAR)**

**CONF 746: Peace Building**

Semester: Fall 2006  
Class Time: Wednesdays, 7:20-10:00 pm  
Location: Arlington Campus, ICAR (Truland) Building  
(Rm. 666B)  
Instructor: *Dennis J.D. Sandole, Ph.D.*  
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**COURSE DESCRIPTION**

The objective of this course is to distill from appropriate theory and practice the essential elements of *Peacebuilding* and in the process, explore the analytical differences but also substantive overlap and possible linkages between: (a) violent conflict *prevention*; (b) conflict *management*; (c) conflict *settlement*; (d) conflict *resolution* and (e) conflict *transformation*.

The discussion will include types of Peacebuilding such as *reactive* Peacebuilding, which is what 3<sup>rd</sup> party interveners attempt *after the fact* of an actual violent conflict involving significant human rights violations -- after "the house has caught on fire" (e.g., as in Bosnia-Herzegovina during the early 1990s). In "inductive," *reactive* Peacebuilding (IRP), members of the "concerned international community" focus initially on one particular type of intervention (in Bosnia, conflict *management* through UNPROFOR) but if that fails, then move on to other types (in Bosnia, conflict *settlement* through NATO bombing of Serb forces and then, following the Dayton Peace Accords, *peace enforcement* with SFOR, IFOR, and currently EUFOR). "Inductive," *reactive* Peacemaking (IRP) may develop into a basis for one possible trajectory toward conflict *transformation* (in Bosnia, through the conflict parties taking the steps necessary to achieve eventual membership in the European Union).

By contrast, *proactive* Peacebuilding is what 3<sup>rd</sup> party interveners attempt *before the fact* of violent conflict. In this case, interveners design and implement an intervention into a *potential* violent conflict to achieve violent conflict *prevention* -- to prevent "the house from catching on fire." If that fails, they may then decide on a strategy of partial "inductive," *reactive* Peacebuilding (IRP), moving first to conflict *management* (preventing the fire from spreading) and if that fails, to conflict *settlement* (forcibly suppressing the fire). If, however, their initial effort at *proactive prevention* succeeds (e.g., as with UNPREDEP in Macedonia), they may then decide to go forward with a strategy of "deductive," *proactive* Peacebuilding

(DPP): employing the full array of multi-sectoral, multi-actor interventions normally reserved for full "inductive" reactive Peacebuilding (IRP), but in which all categories of intervention are designed and implemented from the outset *within* a conflict *transformation* framework.

The course features "deductive," *proactive* Peacebuilding (DPP) as one source of effective Regional and Global Governance, especially (but not only) for Africa, Asia, Latin America, the Middle East and former Soviet Union: what conflict resolution pioneer John W. Burton refers to as conflict *provention* and Oliver Ramsbotham, Tom Woodhouse and Hugh Miall as *Cosmopolitan conflict resolution*. Arguably, it is "deductive," *proactive* Peacebuilding (DPP) that constitutes the ultimate antidote to the deep-rooted causes and conditions of global terrorism.

The major premise underlying the course is that "national interest" is *global interest* and vice versa, especially within the current parameters of Globalization. Moreover, to achieve any objective along the violent conflict *prevention-transformation* gradient at the local, state, interstate or regional levels, policymakers must pay attention to the global level as well: "what goes around comes around!" As Ramsbotham, et al., put it:

Conflict formations run through our political communities *at all levels*, from the global to the national to the local. Moreover, these conflict formations are *intertwined* ... [Accordingly,] there is no possibility of addressing local and regional conflicts without also taking the global and international setting into account (emphasis added).<sup>1</sup>

Finally, the course emphasizes that Peacebuilding -- whether reactive or proactive, inductive or deductive -- is a *multilateral* and not a *unilateral* process, even for the world's sole surviving superpower.

## **COURSE REQUIREMENTS**

1. **Prerequisites:** CONF 501 or 801, or permission of the instructor.

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<sup>1</sup> See Oliver Ramsbotham, Tom Woodhouse, and Hugh Miall (2005). *Contemporary Conflict Resolution: The Prevention, Management and Transformation of Deadly Conflicts*. Cambridge (UK) and Malden (Massachusetts): Polity Press, p. 115.

2. **Assessment:** Students will complete one (final) paper:

[a] A *FINAL PAPER* (25-30 double-spaced pages; **due: no later than Wednesday, 13 December 2006**), in which, using **ALL** of the course readings, students will:

[i] *design a peacebuilding plan* for any conflict, at any level -- current, developing, potential, historical -- inclusive of

[ii] *modalities [i.e., details] of implementation* (e.g., how to achieve **coordination** among multiple actors performing different tasks at the same time and/or at different points over time (**60% of final grade**)).

[b] Students will present on the projects culminating in their final papers for feedback (**20% of final grade**).

[c] Students will also present on the readings assigned for the course and, in any case, are expected to participate in class discussions on readings and in *scenario development exercises* (see below) (**20% of final grade**).

3. **Office Hours:** Wednesdays, 10:00-10:30 pm and by appointment.

4. **Withdrawal:** The last day to drop the course without dean's permission is 12 September 2006.

#### **REQUIRED READINGS**

(1) Abu-Nimer, Mohammed (2001). *Reconciliation, Justice, and Coexistence: Theory and Practice*. Lanham (Maryland) and London: Lexington Books

(2) Boutros-Ghali, Boutros (1992). *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping*. Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992. New York: United Nations, Department of Public Information. Available online at: <<http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/agpeace.html>>.

(3) Cousens, Elizabeth M. and Chetan Kumar (eds.), with Karin Wermester (2001). *Peacebuilding as Politics: Cultivating Peace in Fragile Societies*. [A Project of the International Peace Academy.] Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

(4) Jeong, Howon (2005). *Peacebuilding in Postconflict Societies: Strategy and Process*. Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

- (5) Junne, Gerd and Willemijn Verkoren (eds.) (2004). *Postconflict Development: Meeting New Challenges*. Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- (6) Lederach, John Paul (1997). *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies*. Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP) Press.
- (7) Nan, Susan Allen (2004). "Intervention Coordination." *Intractable Conflict Knowledge Base Project*, Conflict Resolution Consortium, University of Colorado, 13 May  
<[www.beyondintractability.org/m/intervention\\_coordination.jsp](http://www.beyondintractability.org/m/intervention_coordination.jsp)>.
- (8) Ramsbotham, Oliver, Tom Woodhouse and Hugh Miall (2005). *Contemporary Conflict Resolution: The Prevention, Management and Transformation of Deadly Conflicts* (2d Edition). Cambridge (UK) and Malden (MA): Polity Press.
- (9) Reyhler, Luc and Thania Paffenholz (eds.) (2001). *Peacebuilding: A Field Guide*. Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- (10) Sandole, Dennis J.D. (1998). "A Comprehensive Mapping of Conflict and Conflict Resolution: A Three Pillar Approach." *Peace and Conflict Studies*, vol. 5, no. 2, December, pp. 1-30  
<[www.gmu.edu/academic/pcs/sandole](http://www.gmu.edu/academic/pcs/sandole)>.
- (11) Sandole, Dennis J.D. (2002). "Virulent Ethnocentrism: A Major Challenge for Transformational Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding in the Post-Cold War Era." *The Global Review of Ethnopolitics*, Vol. 1, No. 4, pp. 4-27 <[www.ethnopolitics.org](http://www.ethnopolitics.org)>.
- (12) Sokalski, Henryk J. (2003). *An Ounce of Prevention: Macedonia and the UN Experience in Preventive Diplomacy*. Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP) Press.
- (13) Yoder, Carolyn (2005). *The Little Book of Trauma Healing: When Violence Strikes and Community Security is Threatened*. Intercourse (PA): Good Books.

***NOTE: Clearly, the course calls for a great deal of reading, but it is the instructor's view that the course demands nothing less than an attempt to be comprehensive in dealing with peacebuilding in the postmodern (post-Cold War and post-9/11) world.***

#### Course Structure

## I. Introduction.

For the first few class meetings, we will introduce ourselves, overview the course and then start to briefly discuss actual or potential conflicts worldwide, inclusive of failing/failed and collapsing/collapsed states that could involve or are involving significant human rights violations. We will also discuss the interdependent dynamics between domestic and foreign conflicts, plus the *proactive* need to anticipate and deal with likely conflicts over time, as well as the *reactive* need to respond to actual conflicts worldwide in the short term. Implicit here is the need for significant reform of existing, and the need for new, global and regional intergovernmental and NGO institutions to enhance prospects for "concerned members of the international community" to develop a *proactive* Peacebuilding capability, complementing *reactive* Peacebuilding proclivities and practices already in place.

### 30 Aug:

- Introductions.
- Course Expectations.
- Course Overview.

### 6 Sep:

- State of Deadly Conflict in the World.
- The Domestic-Foreign Conflict Nexus
- Need to be Proactive ('Liberal') as well as Reactive ('Conservative').

## II. Typologies/Frameworks of Peace and 3<sup>rd</sup> Party Intervention.

In this section, we will discuss the distinction between *negative* and *positive peace*, as well as the distinction and overlap between a variety of 3<sup>rd</sup> party interventions, depending on where any particular conflict is with regard to intensity and level of threat to regional peace and security. We will also summarize two frameworks for facilitating the analysis and design/implementation of interventions into potential or actual, complex *identity*-based (racial, ethnic, religious, class) conflicts involving potential or actual human rights violations.

**Read:** Boutros-Ghali; Lederach; and Sandole (1998).

### 13/20 Sep:

- Peace.
  - a. Negative.
  - b. Positive.
- 3<sup>rd</sup> Party Interventions.
  - a. Violent Conflict *Prevention* (**Preventive Diplomacy**).
  - b. Violent Conflict *Management* (**Peacekeeping**).
  - c. Violent Conflict *Settlement* (**Coercive Peacemaking**).
  - d. Violent Conflict *Resolution* (**Noncoercive Peacemaking**).
  - e. Violent Conflict *Transformation* (**Peacebuilding**).
- Relevant Frameworks.
  - a. 3 Levels of Conflict Reality.
    - Conflict-as-*Symptoms*.
    - Conflict-as-*Fractured Relationships*.
    - Conflict-as-*Deep Rooted Causes and Conditions*.
  - b. 3 Pillar Mapping of Conflict and Conflict Resolution.
    - Conflict *Elements* (P1).
    - Conflict *Causes and Conditions* (P2).
    - Conflict *Intervention* (P3).

### III. Peacebuilding Successes and Failures: Lessons Learned.

The objective here - *the core domain of the course* -- is to examine a number of cases where various elements or interpretations of Peacebuilding have been attempted, noting failures as well as successes and "lessons learned" with regard to, for example, *reconciliation, sequencing and coordination* (horizontal well as vertical).

**Read:** Abu-Nimer; Cousens & Kumar; Jeong; Junne & Verkoren; Nan; Ramsbotham, et al.; Reychler & Paffenholz; and Sokalski.

**27 Sep:**

-- *European Interventions* (Bosnia-Herzegovina; Croatia [Eastern Slavonia]; Kosovo; Macedonia; Northern Ireland; Spain [Basque Country]).

**4 Oct:**

-- *African Interventions* (Angola; Burundi; Cameroon; Democratic Republic of the Congo; Liberia; Mozambique; Namibia; Sierra Leone; Somalia; South Africa; Uganda).

**11 Oct: Semester Break.**

**18 Oct:** -- *African Interventions, cont'd.*

**25 Oct:**

-- *Asian Interventions* (Cambodia; East Timor; Indonesia [Aceh], Philippines [Mindanao]; Southern Thailand; Sri Lanka; Tajikistan).

**1 Nov:**

-- *Caribbean/Latin American Interventions* (El Salvador; Guatemala; Haiti; Nicaragua).

**8 Nov:**

-- *Middle East Interventions* (Israel/Palestine; Cyprus).

**IV. The European Union as the World's Pre-eminent Peacebuilding Project.**

The objective here is to discuss the EU as the ultimate Peacebuilding project in Europe, if not the world; the sources of its relative success and the prospects for it to be employed as a *model* for other areas and regions worldwide. Included is the role of the EU in absorbing former Cold War "enemies" as well as Yugoslav successor states (e.g., Bosnia, Kosovo, and Serbia) which engaged in genocidal conflict during the 1990s. Of special importance against the background of the Global War on Terror (GWOT) is the potential for the EU to embrace Muslim Turkey as

well, and in the process nip in the bud the self-fulfilling "clash of civilizations" dynamic that has been unleashed by the GWOT.

- Immanuel Kant's "Perpetual Peace" (*Ewige Frieden*).
- Democratic Peace Theory.
- Superordinate Goals.
- Basic Human Needs (BHNs) for *Identity, Recognition, and Security*.
- Conflict *Provention*/"Cosmopolitan Conflict Resolution."

#### **V. Trauma, Historical Memory, Justice, and Reconciliation: "The Devil Lies in the Details."**

Here we examine the necessity of dealing with the psycho-emotional "baggage" that severely traumatized victims carry around with them that must be dealt with *before* reconciliation of any significance can take place. As one example, Armenia's historical conflict with Turkey regarding the issue of the 1915 Genocide must be addressed as a "necessary condition" for Armenia and "Turkic" Azerbaijan to deal effectively with their current conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh. The discussion will also explore approaches to trauma-healing and reconciliation.

**Read:** Abu-Nimer; Jeong (Ch. 6); Ramsbotham, et al. (Ch. 10); Reyhler & Paffenholz (Chs. 12.1-12.8); Sandole (2002); and Yoder.

#### **15 Nov:**

- The Role of Trauma and Historical Memory ("Chosen Trauma") in the Etiology of Violent Conflict.
- Justice *and/or* Reconciliation.
- Trauma Healing.

#### **VI. Conclusion: Further Institutionalizing Peacebuilding as Both the Right and Sensible Thing to Do: Domestically, Nationally, Regionally, and Globally.**

Here, we will briefly explore the implications of insights generated by the course thus far for applications of *reactive* and *proactive* models of Peacebuilding to other areas and regions, including Afghanistan, Armenia/Azerbaijan, Chechnya, Georgia,



Iraq, Moldova, Palestine, and Sudan. We will also discuss the potential role of the U.S. - the world's sole surviving superpower - as a source of Peacebuilding expertise, resources, and leadership. Part of the objective here would be for the U.S. to work with its partners in Europe (the EU, NATO and OSCE) and others worldwide, including the UN, to develop effective Regional and Global Governance. The *new European peace and security system* (NEPSS), a framework designed by the instructor for developing a system of "Cosmopolitan conflict resolution" in Europe, will be discussed as a model for Regional Governance in Europe and elsewhere, ultimately enhancing prospects for the development of Global Governance.

As has been made abundantly clear by President George W. Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair in their prosecution of the war in Iraq, a "neo-conservative-only" approach to dealing with complex identity-based conflicts tends to lead to self-defeating, counter-productive outcomes. Accordingly, this discussion - and the course -- will close with the necessity of resolving the "clash of cultures" between conservatives and liberals in the U.S. and elsewhere in order to complement existing *reactive* models with new *proactive* models of Peacebuilding and to definitively "win" the GWOT.

## 22 Nov:

- Implications of Insights for Other Areas (e.g., Afghanistan, Armenia/Azerbaijan, Chechnya, Georgia, Iraq, Moldova, Palestine, Sudan).
- The Role of the U.S. in Global Peacebuilding.
- The Role of Peacebuilding in Regional and Global Governance.
- "Winning" the GWOT.
- The Ultimate Challenge: Closing the *Simple/Visceral* ['Conservative'] - *Complex/Intellectual* ['Liberal'] Gap.

## VII. Putting it All Together "in Practice" -- Scenarios Development Exercise.

### 29 Nov/6 Dec:

- A. Identity a *Conflict* (Current, Developing or Potential) that Could Worsen or Improve during the Next 5-10 Years (*Pillar 1*).
- B. Explore *Conflict Trajectories*:

1. Identify the Factors -- "*Drivers*" -- that Could Make the Conflict Worse or Better (*Pillar 2*).
  2. Construct a *Scenario* Indicating How these Factors Could Combine to Make the Conflict Worse (**Worst-Case Scenario**=*Negative Trajectory*) or Better (**Best-Case Scenario**=*Positive Trajectory*) (*Pillar 2*).
- C. Design a *Strategy* for Responding to these Factors ("*Drivers*") to Either *Undermine* their Potential Negative Impact or *Enhance* their Positive Impact on the Conflict over Time (*Pillar 3*).

**6-13 Dec: Papers Due.**